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The Origins of Property 1n England 
Robert C. Palmer 
The English common law of real property, as S.F.C. Milsom has argued, 
took shape between 1153 and 1215. 1 The common law gave royal protection 
to free tenements, replacing feudal relationships as the primary bond 
structuring society. The law thus constituted the institutional core of the 
Robert C. Palmer is the Adler Fellow of the Institute of Bill of Rights Law and Assistant 
Professor of Law at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law, The College of William and Mary. 
Various versions of this paper have been given, notably at the University of Chicago Law 
School, the New York University seminar in law and history, and the Sixth British Legal 
History Conference. The criticisms at those meetings have proved uniformly helpful. This 
article was written with the aid of a summer research grant from the National Endowment for 
the Humanities. I would like to thank Kathleen Crotty, my research assistant at Marshall-
Wythe. 
I. The short forms for frequently cited works, primary and secondary respectively, are the 
following: 
Bracton: Henry de Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae, ed. G.E. Wood-
bine and trans. S.E. Thome, (Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1968). 
Glanvill: The treatise on the Laws and customs of the Realm of England Commonly 
Called Glanvil/, ed. G.D.G. Hall (Oxford, 1965). The author will, as is customary, be 
referred to as 'Glanvill' for reasons of convenience. 
CRR: Curia Regis Rolls (London, 1922) [entry numbers instead of page numbers after 
vol. 10]. 
RCR: Rotuli Curiae Regis, ed. F. Palgrave (1835). 
PKJ: Pleas before the King or his Justices, Jl98-1212, ed. D.M. Stenton, Selden 
Society, vols. 67 (London, 1948), 68 (1949), 83 (1966), 84 (1967). 
PRS XIV: Three Rolls of the King's Court in the Reign of King Richard the First, 
ll94-ll95, ed. F.W. Maitland, Pipe Roll Society, vol. XIV (Londori, 1891). 
Registers: Early Registers of Writs, ed. E. de Haas and G.D.G. Hall, Selden Society, 
vol. 87 (London, 1970). 
Milsom, Historical Foundations: S.F.C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Com-
mon Law, 2nd ed. (London and Toronto, 1981). 
Milsom, 'Inheritance by Women': S.F.C. Milsom, 'Inheritance by Women in the 
Twelfth and Early Thirteenth Centuries', in Morris S. Arnold, Thomas A. Green, et 
al., On the Laws and Customs of England: Essays in Honor of Samuel E. Thorne, 
(Chapel Hill, 1981), 60-89. 
Milsom, Legal Framework: S.F.C. Milsom, The Legal Framework of English Feudal-
ism, (Cambridge, 1976). 
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English state. 2 But no Machiavellian monarch constructed the English 
state. 3 Henry II was, rather, a king who presumed the morality and necessity 
of feudal relationships. His innovations, though intentional and carefully 
planned, were directed at narrower and less far-sighted ends. 4 Other changes 
were the result of bureaucratic action. 5 The complex interplay between 
present-oriented political or juridical decisions and bureaucratic rigor gener-
ated a legal system. 
Palmer, Feudal Framework: R.C. Palmer, 'Feudal Framework of English Law', Michi-
gan Law Review 79 (1981), 1130-1164. 
Pollock and Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law: F. Pollock and F.W. Maitland, The History of 
English Law Before the Time of Edward/, 2nd ed. with introduction by S.F.C. Milsom 
(Cambridge, 1968). 
Thome, 'English Feudalism': S.E. Thome, 'English Feudalism and Estates in Land', 
Cambridge Law Journal (1959), 198-209. 
2. R.C. Palmer, The Whitton Dispute, 1264-1380: A Social-Legal Study of Dispute Settle-
ment in Medieval England (Princeton, 1984) 16-17, 215-20; R.C. Van Caenegem, The 
Birth of the English Common Law (Cambridge, 1973), 6-7; Sir Frank Stenton, The 
First Century of English Feudalism, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1961 ), 256-57; Joseph Strayer, 
On the Medieval Origins of the Modem State (Princeton, 1970), 38-47. The role of the 
Exchequer (as a bureaucratic financial organization) in the growth of the English state 
has been overestimated. It provided a financial base for a strong monarchy and func-
tioned bureaucratically in revenue matters from the reign of Henry I. It could not, 
however, form the base for a state until it produced bureaucratic judicial organs. Until 
then it lacked the capacity to impact in a direct beneficial manner on a broad range of 
the population making people associate its existence with their own well-being. Only 
the social impact, not the mere existence of bureaucracy, is relevant to state creation. 
3. Bryce Lyon bluntly summarized the traditional evaluation of the Angevin monarchs: 
'To accelerate the disappearance of feudal law and the concomitant centralization of 
power in their hands, the kings and their counselors developed courts and procedures to 
adjudicate legal differences more rationally and efficiently. The more cases adjudicated 
in royal courts, the more revenue and power for the kings'. (Bryce Lyon, 'The 
Emancipation of Land Law from Feudal Custom', Yale Law Journal 86 (1977), 784.) 
This approach determines monarchical intent from results. Maitland, forced to be brief, 
did little better: 'Speaking briefly, we may say that !Henry II] concentrated the whole 
system of English justice round a court of judges professionally expert in the law. He 
could thus win money-in the Middle Ages no one did justice for nothing-and he 
could thus win power; he could control, and he could starve, the courts of the feudator-
ies. In offering the nation his royal justice, he offered a strong and sound commodity'. 
F.W. Maitland and F.C. Montague, A Sketch of English Legal History (New York and 
London, 1915), 36. Jolliffe's portrayal of the Angevins similarly suffers from an 
anachronistic valuation of vis, voluntas, ira and malevolentia. J.E.A. Jolliffe, Angevin 
Kingship 2nd ed. (London, 1963). It is also not useful to label the Angevins 'autocrats'. 
(Jolliffe and Lyon [Bryce Lyon, A Constitutional and Legal History of Medieval Eng-
land, 2nd ed. (New York, 1980), 244-45]) In a feudal and discretionary society, 
structured by personal relationships such matters were relatively acceptable bases for 
decision-making. See Stenton, English Feudalism, supra note 2, 51; Milsom, Legal 
Framework, 183-86. 
4. Milsom, Legal Framework, 183-86; text accompanying notes 46-63. 
5. See text infra accompanying notes 68-98; Palmer, 'Feudal Framework', 1163; Palmer, 
Whitton Dispute, supra note 2, 215-18; Milsom, Legal Framework, 45-51 (although 
Milsom does not speak straight-forwardly to the nature of bureaucratic a~:tion). 
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This article argues that, although Milsom is correct in the direction of his 
revisionist argument about the origins of the common law, his thesis needs 
careful reworking. His Legal Framework of English Feudalism provided a 
daring, but oracular challenge to Maitland's traditional framework. In the 
second edition of Historical Foundations of the Common Law, Milsom 
summarized his thesis. Both the original work and the summary provide a 
new basis for conceptualizing the origins of the common law. Milsom's 
work assumes a sophisticated notion of property that is not explicitly 
argued. He argues that the common law came about not by a transfer of 
jurisdiction over property claims from feudal courts to the king's court, but 
rather by regulation of feudal contractual obligations: not a painless change 
of jurisdiction, but the production of a body of law by regulation according 
to customs made rigid by bureaucrats. 6 The thesis provides a new con-
ceptual framework for evaluating social mores, legal change, and property 
rights. 
Milsom's thesis remains incomplete. He does not provide a clear chronol-
ogy for the development of the law. Chronology may seem secondary, but 
only through a full chronology can the new conceptualization be tested. For 
instance, Milsom argues from the language of the Assize of Northampton, 
c.4, that mort d'ancestor was directed against lordly action. 7 That seems 
clear. But the reasons why the lords became subject to regulation then and 
the purpose for the regulation remain unspecified. Likewise, the relationship 
of the Assize of Northampton to surrounding events, not least the Com-
promise of 1153, constitutes a substantial problem. Until these matters are 
treated, Maitland's framework will survive, because, fortified by a century 
of scholarship, it still coordinates better the existing data. This article com-
pletes Milsom 's thesis in these particulars. 
Milsom's thesis likewise misconceptualizes the writs of entry. He 
maintained, correctly, that early litigation was not horizontal: not owners 
defending title to property against equals. 8 Early litigation took place in a 
world and according to a model that was strictly hierarchical. The assize of 
novel disseisin, the assize of mort d'ancestor, and the writ of right patent 
were conceptually upward: they were tenants' claims against lords. The 
writs of entry, however, were downward looking: claims of lords against 
their tenants. They became necessary in the thirteenth century only because 
lords had been disabled from challenging tenants' warrants in the lords' own 
courts. The entry words in the writ were therefore jurisdictional words: the 
writs were properly within the jurisdiction of the king's court because the 
lord to whom the case would ordinarily pertain was himself the claimant. 
The lord thus remitted his court by buying the writ. 9 
There is much to Milsom 's conceptualization of the writs of entry: it does 
demonstrate a social situation behind the writ. The thesis, nevertheless, fails 
6. See Palmer, 'Feudal Framework', 1132-33. 
7. Milsom, Legal Framework, 164-66; Historical Foundations, 137-39. 
8. Mi1som, Historical Foundations, 119-24. 
9. Ibid., 147-48. 
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to address the legal conceptualization and the formal development of the 
writs. The social and legal conceptualizations of writs were different ~ven 
this early. Milsom's conflation of the two prevents a successful explanation 
of the mechanics and development of the rules pertaining to the writs. 
Distinguishing the social and legal conceptualizations, moreover, lays the 
foundation for explaining, in a later article, the economic impact of the 
origins of the common law. Explaining legal technicality is not merely 
the legal remedy for insomnia: it can have immense historical interest. 
This article, then, provides a structure for a social-legal understanding of 
Angevin law and society in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The argu-
ment draws heavily on Milsom's work, in particular his theses about the 
nature of legal change, of property, and of Angevin England. The result 
here, however, is decidedly different. The chronological structure, the 
identification of problems avoided by Milsom 's approach, the solution of 
new problems suggested by his assumptions, and the necessary correctives 
to his thesis yield an account of the development of property law that relates 
explicitly to social phenomena. 
Property and Feudal Relationships 
Property right was antithetical to twelfth-century feudal relationships. 
Such a contrast is traditional, but the indices for gauging both have been 
mistaken. Some recent scholarship declines to consider feudal relationships 
vital after the mid-twelfth century. 10 On the contrary, however, England 
was decisively feudal throughout the reign of Henry II; property only 
appeared around 1200. 
The feudal relationship involved profound mutual obligations, repre-
sented and secured by a precarious grant of land. The lord provided pro-
tection and maintenance of his man. The man's obligation in return was 
symbolized by the homage, the 'man-ing', he gave the lord for his fee. By 
that ceremony he entered into a relationship of subordination: in all things he 
10. See J .C. Holt, 'Politics and Property in Early Medieval England', Past and Present 57 
(1972), 3-52; J .C. Holt, 'Feudal Society and the Family in Early Medieval England: I. 
The Revolution of 1066', Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 32 (1982), 
193-212; and J.C. Holt, 'Feudal Society and the Family in Early Medieval England: II. 
Notions of Patrimony', Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 33 (1983), 193-
220 which concern only social notions of inheritance and dismiss jurisdictional matters 
and enforcement as irrelevant. The problem with Holt's argument is that there is a 
difference between social notions--essentially, then, ideas about what is just and moral 
and expected-on the one hand and property and ownership on the other. The existence 
of social ideas about inheritance logically must precede the appearance of property, but 
the social ideas are neither equivalent to property nor do they necessitate it. Social ideas 
about inheritance were controlled by social ideas about the lord's authority: ju-
risdictional matters are not irrelevant trivia. Moreover, indeterminancy of rules con-
cerning descent is not mere vagueness: it connotes lordly authority, not that the thought 
about descent had not been considered. Finally, some thought about the nature of 
inheritance was inevitable from ecclesiastical practice; that consideration weakens 
whatever force arguments relating notions of heirship to land have. 
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was to further his lord's earthly honor. 11 Obviously he had to render his 
knightly or other services conscientiously. The ways in which the relation-
ship dominated the tenant's family are revealing. The lord, not the widow, 
would be the heir's guardian. 12 The lord as guardian would designate the 
heir's spouse. 13 Not only in the battlefield, but also in the familial context, 
the man's personal interests were subordinated to his lord's. Default in those 
obligations forfeited the fee. 14 
Politico-moral considerations moderated lordly control. A good lord 
functioned by the counsel of his men: they constituted his court; they ren-
dered the judgments. 15 Together, lord and men constituted a unit for the 
exercise of force and influence. Group benefit dictated a balance between 
assuring the lord the services of his tenants and the insistence on the lord's 
standing by his undertakings. The tyrannical or capricious lord could not 
expect loyalty indefinitely, nor could the unreliable man expect to continue 
to reap benefits without shouldering burdens. Given that balancing con-
sideration, feudal relationships could not be governed by any strict defini-
tion of the rights or obligations of lords. Results probably varied according 
to the prestige of the lord, the reputation and past history of the man, and the 
needs of a particular group at the time, in addition to the facts involved in a 
given dispute. 16 Feudal courts had vast discretion. Claims to land were 
claims for the benefit of a personal relationship. 17 Personal relationships and 
the tenures dependant on them were essentially different from property 
rights. 
The heir's succession was an important part of the relationship. 18 The lord 
was buying a man; Joyal knights were valuable. Loyalty only came from 
those without choices or from those fairly treated and fairly bought. The fee, 
the price of the man, was maintenance for life and provision for survivors: 
both his heir and his widow. 19 Dower-the widow's portion-and succes-
sion to the fee necessarily had roots in family structures, but they attached to 
II. Glanvill, IX.I; English Historical Documents. val. II. 1042-1189. ed. David C. Doug-
las, George W. Greenaway (New York, 1913), 725. 
12. Glanvill, IX.4; Milsom, Historical Foundations, 107-109. 
13. Milsom, Historical Foundations, 108. 
14. Ibid., 109, 406. 
15. 'The Constitutions of Clarendon', Select Charters and Other lllustrations of English 
Constitutional Historv, ed. William Stubbs, 9th ed. (Oxford, 1913), 165-166; Milsom, 
Historical Foundatio~s, 102-103; Stenton, English Feudalism, supra note 2, 45; Pol-
lock and Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, 1:592. 
16. See e.g., Chronicle of Battle Abbey, ed. Eleanor Searle (Oxford, 1980), 174-208; 
English Historical Documents, val. ll, supra note II, 724-33. 
17. Milsom, Legal Framework, 42, 63; Palmer, 'Feudal Framework', 1134-35. 
18. Milsom, Legal Framework, 179-80; S.E. Thome, 'English Feudalism', 195-200. 
19. For dower as part of the fee, see text infra accompanying notes 58-63. 
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a precarious life-time tenure only as the lord's obligation to his former 
tenant: not a right in the heir or widow to certain lands, but an obligation of 
the lord to his deceased man. 20 That price, however, was fair: the widow 
could be married off again, 21 and the heir had been raised in the lord's 
service. 
Succession was only a matter of price, not a gauge of the strength of the 
feudal relationship. Lordly control might seem seriously impaired once he 
could no longer arbitrarily accept a stranger rather than the deceased tenant's 
descendant, that is, when the land was functionally heritable. The lord, 
however, usually wanted the heir anyway: he was at hand, loyal, and famil-
iar. Loyalty can be passed down the generations as easily as can land. Lords 
could accommodate the occasional stranger by marrying him to an heiress. 
Such an arrangement provided for the girl. Her husband would then do 
homage for the land, 22 so the lord had his new man but still had fulfilled his 
undertaking to his now deceased old tenant. 23 Moreover, there was a strong 
presumption that the eldest male son would be available and familiar to the 
lord: he would normally be chosen the heir. Primogeniture was sensible 
custom before it was a rule of law. 24 But as custom it was not a rule: an 
unacceptable eldest son would be rejected in favor of another, but accept-
able, descendant, now heir. 25 Succession was no danger to the lord: it was 
an advantage. Succession of heirs is thus no gauge of the strength of feudal 
control. 
The real gauge of the strength of the feudal relationship is the lord's 
disciplinary power: his ability to disinherit the tenant for disloyalty. Choice 
of a tenant mattered less than the lord's power to evict the disloyal or 
incompetent tenant. Regardless of regular succession, the tenement re-
20. The widow or heir could still claim dower or fee: they would remind the lord of his 
undertaking and the propriety of the heir being the recipient. But the undertaking to the 
late tenant was equally well fulfilled if the eldest son, a scoundrel, was passed over in 
favor of the second son. The right thus was not in a person designated by abstract law, 
even though there certainly were customs for preference. 
21. Glanvill, VJI.I2. 
22. Glanvill, IX.I. 
23. Originally, a grant 'to A. and his heirs' was only an undertaking to A. It did not commit 
the lord to acceptance of any particular person or to heirs in perpetuity. The lord's 
obligation would be fully met by marrying the heiress to a man. The heiress would be 
secure for her life. The grant to the husband when he did homage for his wife's 
inheritance would again be in the form 'to B. and his heirs'. Since husband and wife 
might have the same heir, the land could continue to descend apparently to A.'s heirs. 
Moreover, there was no undertaking to the heirs directly; if A. was disloyal or in-
competent, he forfeited the tenement completely without his heir receiving anything. 
The lord's undertaking was completely to the tenant until he had likewise committed 
himself to a specific person as A.'s heir. See Milsom, Historical Foundations, 106; 
Thorne, 'English Feudalism', 193. 
24. Thorne, 'English Feudalism', 196-98. 
25. RCR, 1:360 (younger son preferred to weak older brother during Stephen's reign). 
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mained precarious as long as the lord had his disciplinary authority intact. 
The regularity of succession in the early twelfth century only shows feudal 
relationships operating normally in an increasingly settled society primarily 
structured by feudal ties. Because the lord's disciplinary authority remained 
intact, feudal relationships remained vital in England into the 1190s. 26 
Property rights were inherently antithetical to feudal holdings. Property, 
however, was neither an elemental idea nor a primordial fact. Property is not 
merely a distinction beween 'mine' and 'yours'. 27 Such a differentiation can 
be found in most societies and at a very early stage. Even in our own society 
that distinction does not uniformly indicate property; at times it indicates 
mere attachment. For historical purposes the 'mine'-'yours' distinction is 
useless. Property as a legal phenomenon occurs only when an individual's 
claim to a parcel of land is not dependent on his own strength or on a 
personal relationship: when title is protected by a bureaucratic authority 
according to set rules. Property derives from the state; it cannot exist prior to 
the state. 
People were often vociferously attached to particular tenements prior to 
the late twelfth century. That phenomenon does not weaken the argument. 
One who lost his land by disciplinary action or warfare would feel himself 
wronged, regardless of the merits: real life knows few stoics. In the victim's 
eyes, righting the wrong would involve restoration of the tenement. The 
elemental idea, however, was that of wrong, not property. 2 ~:~ Similarly, a son 
could claim to succeed his father, but his claim appealed to the lord to honor 
the undertaking made to the claimant's ancestor. Even if the claimant en-
listed the king's intervention, the situation still only revealed an 
26. Thorne, 'English Feudalism', 209; Milsom, Legal Framework, 1-35. For the emphasis 
on regularity of succession, see Holt, 'Politics and Property', supra note 9, 30-31 (with 
some recognition of disciplinary action); RaGena DeAragon, 'The growth of secure 
inheritance in Anglo-Norman England', Journal of Medieval History 8 (1982), 381-91 
('In conclusion, the Anglo-Norman baronage enjoyed fairly secure inheritance in the 
reign of Henry I as long as they remained loyal to the king'. Ibid., 389). 
27. A good example on how reliance on 'mine-yours' terminology results in an inadequate 
view of the nature of property is Jeffrey Hackney, 'Review of S.F.C. Milsom, Histori-
cal Foundations of the Common Law, 2nd ed.' The Journal of Legal History, 5 ( 1984), 
79-84. 
28. The tradition of scholarship in medieval materials obscures the point. Consider an 
apartment dweller prior to state regulation of landlords. The tenant might well be 
secure; his parents might have occupied the apartment before him. He could easily be 
very emotionally attached, and even a new tenant would refer continuously to 'my 
apartment'. No one, however, would maintain that he owned the apartment. His claim 
to continued residence there depended on the mutual obligations between himself and 
the landlord, and the consequence of a minor fault could be eviction. The tenant in such 
a situation would feel greatly wronged. But his feeling of injury would not mean that he 
thought he owned the apartment: the reality of his dependence was one of the basic data 
of his existence. The definitional element in all this is crucial. Properly defined, the 
emergence of property is an extraordinarily important matter of social structure. The 
increased independence of apartment dwellers after state enforcement of commonly 
accepted landlord practices is the modern analogue of the medieval phenomenon. 
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obligation. 29 There were only two elemental legal ideas in twelfth century 
England: wrongs and obligations. 30 Bureaucratic justices created property 
by myopic regulatory decisions that eradicated the discretionary character of 
the feudal relationship and thus the precarious quality of the fee. The crea-
tion of property was subtle, but momentous. 
Political Settlements and the Beginning of 
the Common Law 
Political settlements often have legal ramifications. When 'substantive 
law', however, was still normative and not cast in rules of law, politics had 
a greater capacity to affect legal phenomena. Political settlements produced 
the momentous changes in late twelfth century England. The two great 
political events were the Compromise of 1153 and the Assize of North-
ampton of 1176. The former introduced the first, albeit narrow, categorical 
protection of tenants against lords: the first time the king resolved to in-
terfere between lords and men in a regular instead of an ad hoc manner. The 
latter, the Assize of Northampton, established regular, intensive supervision 
of feudal courts. The Compromise of 1153 made the Assize of Northampton 
possible, but did not cause it. The Compromise of 1153 was a temporary 
measure oriented to the past; the innovations of the Assize of Northampton 
were permanent and future-looking. Neither, however, was anti-feudal; in-
deed, both assumed the necessity and desirability of strong feudal rela-
tionships. 
The Compromise of 1153 resolved the warfare endemic in the reign of 
Stephen ( 1135-1154). The Compromise had two components. The first was 
the Treaty of Westminster, the settlement of the claims to kingship. 31 King 
Stephen, it was agreed, would remain king for the rest of his life; Henry, the 
grandson of Henry I, was to become king at Stephen's death to the exclusion 
of Stephen's son and heir. The followers of both leaders undertook to 
preserve the terms of the Treaty. The dynastic settlement alone would not 
29. The king, in intervening, was claiming a favor as well as trying to assure order in the 
ranks. Even when itinerant justices presided over cases under Henry I, the important 
consideration is the standards they applied. In Henry I's day, the standards would have 
been discretionary. No body of abstract property law governed adjudication; nor was 
the lack of rules of law considered a deficiency. The court considered only what would 
be just in the given instance, the decision usually then relating to proof. 
30. Wrongs and obligations are different, despite modern conceptions. They cannot be 
collapsed into each other, even though the non-fulfillment of an obligation may be a 
wrong. When an heir asked to be recognized, he was claiming the benefit of an 
obligation: no wrong had been done, but there was a case in court. Obligations properly 
look toward performance; wrongs, toward damages. Remedies for wrongs increasingly 
suppressed elemental ideas of obligation. 
31. Regesta Regum Ang/o-Normannorum, vol. 3 ( 1135-54 ), ed. H.A. Cronne and R.H.C. 
Davis (Oxford, 1967), 272; R.H.C. Davis, King Stephen, 1135-1154 (Berkeley and 
Los Angeles, 1967), 122-23. 
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have pacified the countryside. The second component of the Compromise, 
therefore, was the resolution of the competing claims of the followers of 
Stephen and Henry. 32 Warfare had occasioned many disinheritances, either 
by conquest and regrant or by disciplinary action. The second component 
thus had to resolve those competing tenurial claims. The alternative would 
have been continued military skirmishes. 
The two components were conceptually identical: the Treaty of 
Westminster was the model for the restoration of the disinherited. An 
accepted tenant currently possessed of lands would remain tenant for life. At 
his death, however, his heir would be denied in favor of an outside claimant 
whose ancestor had been tenant in fee in 1135 such that, in the normal 
course of things, he would have been regarded as heir. The Compromise 
thus projected royal power into lord-man relations at their weakest point: 
since a feudal grant could only be for a life, it was most precarious at a 
death. This compromise did not abolish the lord's authority to control and 
discipline his men: lords were only prevented from disciplining for matters 
relating to Stephen's reign. That was a minor exception to their control. 
Current tenants in 1153 had the chance to be loyal; if they proved disloyal, 
they could be ejected. 33 Most tenants and outside claimants found a com-
32. Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II, and Richard/, The Chronicles of Robert 
ofTorigni, Abbot of the Monastery of St. Michael-in-Peril-of-the-Sea, ed. R. Howlett 
(Pub. No. 82 in Rerum Britannicarum Medii Aevi Scriptores, 1889), 4: 177; Davis, 
King Stephen, supra note 31, 122 (translation slightly modified: 'It was also sworn that 
possessions which had been snatched away by intruders would be recalled to the ancient 
and legitimate possessors whose they were in the time of the excellent King Henry [I]'); 
Gesta Stephani, K. Potter, trans., 2d ed. (Oxford, 1976), 240 (translation slightly 
modified: 'So it was provided and firmly established that, arms having been completely 
laid down, peace should be restored everywhere in the kingdom, the new castles should 
be demolished, the disinherited should be recalled to their own, and rights and laws 
commanded to all according to pristine custom'.) See Davis, King Stephen, supra note 
31, 122-25; J. Appleby, The Troubled Reign of King Stephen (New York, 1969), 197; 
and W .L. Warren, Henry II, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1973), 333 for less optimistic 
assessments of the effects of the Compromise of 1153. Recognition of property right or 
strict acceptance of the 'hereditary principle' would allow no delay in the restoration of 
property to the owners. That 'ali-or-nothing' approach seems to lie behind the pessimis-
tic assessments in Davis, Appleby, and Warren. Davis supposed that the royal settle-
ment was the pattern for the barons, but in the sense of an acceptance of the hereditary 
principle. Sons succeeding fathers as a phenomenon was fairly regular under Henry I, 
barring disciplinary action (supra note 26). Milsom seems to think the Compromise had 
some importance. Milsom, Legal Framework, 178-79. 
33. This applied preeminently to the king. CRR, 8:357; 9:332. In one case Henry II was 
said to have disseised a tenant per voluntatem because of a discord between the tenant 
and an outsider; in the other he disseised a tenant for not receiving his dogs. In each 
case, however, the tenant lost his whole fee instead of merely a portion: that was proper 
in disciplinary disinheritance. Warren, Henry II, supra note 32, 101, 110, 233, 242, 
247, 367. It was likewise true for other lords: Glanvill, YII.I2 (a father to be dis-
inherited for marrying off a prospective heiress without the lord's consent; a doweress 
to be disinherited for marrying without consent of the lord; incontinent heiresses to be 
disinherited); Vll.l7 (a convicted felon to be disinherited); IX. I (disinheritance of 
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promise of their own attractive: the tenant, to assure his heir of some stan-
ding; the outsider, to procure some immediate gain instead of a long-delayed 
expectancy. From the lord's perspective, compromise was the duty of both. 
A tenant's intransigency that forced the lord to reject an acceptable heir 
hardly furthered the lord's earthly honor; moreover, the disruption in the 
present occasioned by the existence of an outside claimant inevitably 
affected the homage group. 34 A compromise or the death of one party 
without heir resolved most problems; relatively few situations came to 
litigation. 35 The Compromise was masterful: it encouraged peaceful, con-
those who do anything to the lord's disinheritance, who do violence to him, who deny 
the service due); IX.II (disinheritance for purpresture against the lord). The matters in 
IX.I come within the cognizance of the lord's court explicitly without the necessity of a 
writ. 
34. Henry II was not constrained by royal supervision. Nothing prevented him from de-
manding compromise and disciplining the inflexible, except the indeterminant bounds 
of his own adherence to his undertakings and the expectations of his tenants-in-chief. 
35. The following cases recount events in Stephen's reign that precipitated a compromise or 
resulted eventually in litigation: (I) Piron v. Piron, PRS XIV, 9 (a forfeiture granted 
thereafter by the Empress Matilda and Brian of Wallingford; a subsequent marriage 
between the descendants of the new grantee and the descendants of the disinherited line; 
alleged pressure by Henry II involved in the marriage); (2) Raimes v. Welles, RCR, 
I :93 (a wartime seizure granted thereafter by Henry II, with a subsequent dispute after 
the new grantee died); (3) Son of Hamon v. Son of John, RCR, I :360 (dispute between 
grandson of firstborn passed over and son of second son preferred in wartime); (4) 
Holewell v. Son of Ascelin, RCR, I :440-41 (the lord preferred an outsider to a minor 
during the Anarchy; afterwards they divided the land and intermarried, but a dispute 
remained about whether the disinherited party had received his portion of the land from 
the new tenant or from the lord); (5) Cotele v. Constable, CRR, 5:147-48 (a discipli-
nary disinheritance by Stephen and a grant to an outsider; Henry II later concorded 
them, with lands remaining to Stephen's grantee for life, reversion to the disinherited 
party, although Constable alleged a disseisin by Henry II sua voluntate et sine judicio. 
See Warren, Henry II, supra note 41, 333: there had been a previous disciplinary 
disinheritance by the Empress); (6) Baiocis v. son of Nigel, CRR, 5: 181-82; 6: 17 (a 
younger son intruded on land in Stephen's reign and granted to a woman in maritagium; 
elder line sued under Henry II in lord's court, where they were concorded, the benefici-
ary of the grant after the intrusion received other lands for life !capable of being termed 
escambium]); (7) Niger v. Panton, CRR, 6:46 (tenant's title based on entry through 
marriage to a doweress, whose first husband had held in 1135; tenant was greatgrand-
son of second husband; 1210 was possibly the first chance available to sue after his 
death); (8) Abbot of Stanley v. Bloet, CRR, 6:178-79 (a grant by the Empress, with a 
subsequent arrangement of a life estate, but the text is too damaged to ascertain the 
context; see CRR, 6:234 for the issue); (9) Gurnaco v. Tingrie, CRR, 6:272-73 
(Stephen granted to claimant's father, who held it through the first years of Henry's 
reign; Henry II seized the land shortly after 1160 I for disciplinary reasons or at death of 
tenant?], but had confirmed the wife in her dower lands; Henry then granted the land to 
tenant's father); (10) Badele v. Tateshale, CRR, 8:18-20 (a wartime disciplinary dis-
inheritance of tenant's ancestor with grant by Stephen to claimant's grandfather, who 
then granted to another; under Henry II the disinherited tenant sued and recovered in the 
king's court prior to the death of either Stephen's grantee or the grantee's grantee, the 
latter receiving escambium. The now restored disinherited's heir held for seven years, 
when the dispute was compromised by marriage. One side, however, alleged that the 
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sensual resolutions and spread the consequences over the years. The mastery 
of the compromise, however, derived solely from the pattern of the royal 
settlement: that resolution was the outgrowth of stalemate and thus a 
genuine compromise. 
The tension produced by the second component of the Compromise ne-
cessitated two kinds of royal intervention in a lord's affairs. The first was.in 
favor of the outside claimant. Since the Compromise was a royal undertak-
ing, even though it was based on strong magnate consensus, lords would be 
reluctant to enforce its consequences within their own homage groups. A 
lord dealing with a deceased tenant's son would probably want to accept 
him. The writ of right patent was the royal intervention reinforcing the 
outsider's claim, pressuring the lord to consider the treaty's terms in this 
instance. 36 If the lord refused to honor the writ, the claimant could remove it 
into the county court. 37 The outsider's claim was not a claim of property, 
but a royally-reinforced demand that the lord hold right to him:38 that he 
stand to his prior obligations or those of his ancestors. 
woman had the land only in dower; the other that she had it by maritagium by grant 
from the other side. At the time of the marriage the issue was probably buried). 
There are other claims from 1135, but without sufficient specification to know 
whether they contain an 1153 issue: CRR, 7:20; 7:293; 8:43; 8:252; 8:295; 8:356; 
9:251; 9:234; 9:364; 9:474; 10:108; 10:114; 10:148; 10:137. 
36. The writ of right patent became standardized shortly after Henry II became king. See 
R.C. Van Caenegem, Royal Writs in England from the Conquest to Glanvi/1, Selden 
Society, vol. 77 (London, 1959), 421 (no. 19): (translation modified) 'Robert, earl of 
Leicester; to Reginald de Warenne, greetings. I order you to hold full right without 
delay to Robert de Mandeville concerning the land of Digswell with its appurtenances 
which was William de Mandeville's, his brother, which he claims to hold from you. 
And if you do not, Robert de Valognes will. And if he does not, I shall make it to be 
done'. Compare this with Glanvill, XII.3: (translation modified) 'The king to earl W. 
greetings. I order you to hold full right without delay toN. concerning ten carucates of 
land in Middleton which he claims to hold from you by the free service of one knight's 
fee for all service, of which R. son of W. de forces him. And if he does not, the sheriff 
of Nottingham will, that I hear no further complaint thereof for default of justice. 
Witness. etc'. 
Compromise enforcement was not the only reason for the writs; Henry II was also 
interested in restoration of lands stolen from ecclesiastical establishments (Palmer, 
'Feudal Framework', 1147-49). Compromise enforcement, however, explains the 
standardization and also the operational peculiarity of the writ of right patent that the 
demandant could buy his writ long before it was needed and keep it in his possession. 
(Van Caenegem, Royal Writs, 171-72.) That retention by the claimant was unique 
among royal writs. The oddity served two purposes. It reassured the demandant, in 
advance, of royal backing. It also made it possible for the outsider to intervene im-
mediately on the death of the tenant. Otherwise, outsiders, occupied in searching for 
the writ, would come too late and face the tenant's heir already accepted. 
37. Placita Anglo-Normannica, ed. M.M. Bigelow (Boston, 1881), 212; Glanvill, XII.6,7; 
R.C. Palmer The County Courts of Medieval England, 1150-1350, (Princeton, 1982), 
144-47. 
38. The Latin is 'plenum rectum teneas', which has traditionally been rendered 'do full 
right' (Glanvill, XIII.3; Registers, I (Hib. 1), 18 (CA.l); Milsom, Legal Framework, 
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The second kind of categorical royal intervention protected the current 
tenant. The easiest situation for royal intervention was that in which a lord 
disseised a man for disloyal actions prior to 1153. That period was to be cast 
into oblivion. 39 There would be no retaliation. The difficult case was the 
tenant who was unwilling to compromise with the outside claimant despite 
pressure from the lord. The Compromise dictated a certain immunity for the 
tenant who was loyal except for his refusal to compromise with the outsider. 
·If he chose to ignore the consequences for his heir and to enjoy his tenancy 
as had King Stephen, he could rely on royal support. But such intractibility 
ran against the lord's normal interests and the tenant's normal duty: the 
temptation to discipline such a tenant would have been great. 40 Such action 
by a lord--or lordly inaction by which a tenant lost his tenement 41-was 
precisely an action against the king because it was contrary to his undertak-
ing. Contempt of the king in this way led to the quasi-criminal appearance42 
of the pre-history of the assize of novel disseisin,43 the remedy for disseisins 
made unjustly and without judgment. 
58, 72; Milsom, Historical Foundations, 124, 127.) That translation embodies a Mait-
land view of the writ of right patent: that feudal courts were impartial fora. The phrase 
literally is 'hold full right': a rendition that properly conveys an obligation deriving 
from a relationship and that illustrates the connection between the obligation grounding 
this writ and the obligation grounding covenant (prior to the specialty rule). 
39. The often-noted studied avoidance of Stephen's reign, usually interpreted as a Tudores-
que comment on the previous reign, was a benefit to Stephen's followers. Palmer, 
'Feudal Framework', 1143-44. Note that acquisitions by marriage were secure, even by 
the terms of the Treaty of Westminster as related to Stephen's son William. 
40. See supra note 31. 
41. Palmer, 'Feudal Framework', 1150-51. Protection could not be simply against lordly 
action, because calculated lordly. inaction was an effective way of eliminating an 
intransigent tenant challenged by a better-positioned outsider. 
42. The history proposed for regulation of disseisins prior to 1176 in Palmer, 'Feudal 
Framework', 1149-53, seems mostly still acceptable, except that the analysis of the 
Assize of Northampton here suggests strongly the regulatory purpose behind the assize 
and thus is closer to Milsom's view. The role of writs of protection while Henry was 
away, however, together with the relationship to the Compromise, probably provided 
the quasi-criminal element (Gianvill, XIII.38) as well as the sporadic nature of early 
edicts. Henry handled matters directly when he was in England and had no need of 
edicts then; he prohibited certain matters when he left the country. Edicts were thus 
forward-looking in time until the Assize of Northampton, which has a limitation in the 
past. 
43. See the form of the writ in Glanvill, XIII.33: 'The king to the sheriff, greetings. N. has 
complained to me that R. unjustly and without a judgment has disseised him of his free 
tenement in such-and-such a viii since my last voyage to Normandy. Therefore I 
command you that, if N. gives you security for prosecuting his claim, you are to see 
that the chattels which were taken from the tenement are restored to it, and that the 
tenement and the chattels remain in peace until Sunday after Easter. And meanwhile 
you are to see that the tenement is viewed by twelve free and lawful men of the 
neighborhood, and their names endorsed on this writ. And summon them by good 
summoners to be before me or my justices on the Sunday after Easter, ready to make 
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These early royal interventions deriving from the Compromise were not 
considered as possessory and proprietary remedies. They were not ju-
risprudentially calculated to provide rational treatment of property rights: a 
possessory level to discourage self-help and a proprietary level to determine 
title. 44 The interventions were designed rather for specific situations and 
specific persons. Nor were the interventions general property right reme-
dies: they were available not for all tenants and claimants but only for 
special cases on an ad hoc basis and for those affected by the Anarchy. 45 
The consequences of the Compromise of 1153 were significant, but they 
were limited. They do not reveal royal machinations to produce a central-
ized royal government freed from feudal relationships. 
The Assize of Northampton ( 1176) was made possible by, but was 
otherwise unrelated to the Compromise of 1153; ultimately, it was more 
significant. The Assize of Northampton resulted from the war between 
Henry II and his eldest son, Henry the Young King, in 1173-74. The Young 
King had been crowned in 1170, while his father still lived. By 1173 he was 
sufficiently disturbed about having the title without the power that he re-
volted, joined by many magnates. 46 They had done homage to him also, and 
he was their immediate lord. Henry II survived the revolt, but dealt gener-
ously with the rebels in the Treaty of Mountlouis. 47 This is not consistent 
with a view of Henry II as a strong king who distrusted feudal power. He did 
not wish to discourage loyalty to lords, but he would prevent rebellion. 
The Assize of Northampton was oriented to the present and future, not the 
past. It did not derive from the Treaty of Mountlouis, but only sought to 
avoid future uprisings. Chapters 4 and 5 are those relevant to this purpose: 
4. Item, if any freeholder has died, let his heredes (here, 'heiresses') 
remain possessed of such seisin as their father had of his fee on the day of his 
death; and let them have his chattels from which they may execute the dead 
the recognition. And summon R., or his bailiff if he himself cannot be found, on the 
security of gage and reliable sureties to be there then to hear the recognition. And have 
there the summoners, and this writ and the names of the sureties. Witness, etc.' 
44. See e.g., Van Caenegem, Birth of the English Common Law, supra note 2, 40-44; 
D.W. Sutherland, The Assize of Novel Disseisin, (Oxford, 1973), 2-5. 
45. This general purpose does not exclude usages that kings generally advocated, such as 
restoration of ecclesiastical holdings lost during a previous reign. Palmer, 'Feudal 
Framework', 1143. 
46. For an account of the war, see Warren, Henry II, supra note 32, 117-41. The coinci-
dence of Becket's murder in 1170 falling before the war is usually mentioned (Ibid., 
135) as a factor; what has not been associated with the uprising and the magnates' 
discontent is that also in 1170 the deforciant clause was included in the writ of right 
patent (see supra, note 36). In addition to the more important implication of the king's 
intrusiveness in the magnates' relationships with their men, that would have meant an 
increased incidence of escambium obligations. Some lords may have felt dis-
advantaged. 
47. Warren, Henry II, supra note 32, 140-45. 
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man's will. And afterwards let them seek out his lord and pay him a relief and 
the other things which they ought to pay him from the fee. And if the heres 
(here, 'heir') be under age, Jet the lord of the fee receive his homage and keep 
him in ward so long as he ought. Let the other lords, if there are several, 
likewise receive his homage, and let him render them what is due. And Jet the 
widow of the deceased have her dower and that portion of his chattels which 
belongs to her. And should the lord of the fee deny the heirs of the deceased 
seisin of the said deceased which they claim, Jet the justices of the lord king 
thereupon cause an inquisition to be made by twelve lawful men as to what 
seisin the deceased held there on the day of his death. And according to the 
result of the inquest let restitution be made to his heirs. And if anyone shall do 
anything contrary to this and shall be convicted of it, Jet him remain at the 
king's mercy. 
5. Item, Jet the justices of the lord king cause an inquisition to be made 
concerning disseisins carried out contrary to the assize, since the lord king's 
coming into England immediately following upon the peace made between 
him and the king, his son. 48 
48. Select Charters. supra note 15, 179-80: 
'4. Item, si quis obierit francus-tenens, haeredes ipsius remaneant in tali .wisina 
qua/em pater suus habuit die qua fuit vivus et mortuus, de feodo suo; et catalla sua 
habeant uncle faciant divisam defuncti: et dominum suum postea requirant, et ei faciant 
de relevio et aliis quae ei facere de bent de feodo suo. Et si haeres fuerit infra aetatem, 
dominus feodi recipiat homagium suum et habeat in custodia ilium quamdiu deberet. 
Alii domini, si plures fuerint, homagium ejus recipiant, et ipse facial eis quod facere 
debuerit. Et uxor defuncti habeat dotem suam et partem de catallis ejus quae eam 
contingit. Et si dominus feodi negat haeredibus defuncti saisinam ejusdem defuncti 
quam exigunt, Justitiae domini regis faciant inde fieri per cognitionem per duodecim 
legales homines, qua/em saisinam defunctus habuit die qua fuit vivus et mortuus; et 
sicut recognitum fuerit, ita haeredibus ejus restituant. Et si quis contra fecerit et inde 
attaint us fuerit; remaneat in misericordia regis.' 
'5. Item Justitiae domini regis faciant fieri recognitionem de dissaisinis fact is super 
Assisam, a tempore quo dominus rex venit in Angliam proximo post pacemfactam inter 
ipsum et regem filum suum.' 
I do not maintain that 'heredes' as the plural form always means 'heiresses'; it 
obviously does not. Only 'the omission of the duty of homage, together with the 
contrasting mention of homage later on in connection with the mention of the 'heres' 
justifies this understanding. 
Warren apparently felt that the substance was adequately conveyed without the infant 
heir and doweress clauses, omitting them by an ellipse (Warren, Henry II, supra note 
32, 343). Sources of English Constitutional History, ed. Carl Stephenson and F.G. 
Marcham, (New York, 1972), I :81, and Doris M. Stenion, English Justice Between the 
Norman Conquest and the Great Charter, 1066-1215 (Philadephia, 1964), 44 translate 
'dotem' in the doweress provision as 'dowry', ignoring Glanvill's cautions about the 
two means of 'dos' in England (Gianvill, VI. I; VII.I). D. Stenton (Ibid.) perplexingly 
translates 'pater suus' as 'his father' despite the fact that the reflexive refers to 
'heredes' and thus is 'their father'. For the proper treatment of the reflexive in identical 
instances, see Hall's translation in Glanvill, VII. I (p. 73), VII.3 (pp. 76, 78), VII.5, 
and VII.9 (p. 82: following the words of the Assize of Northampton). 
Finally, the regulatory purpose that this translation allows relates the Assize to the 
preceding war in a way that obviates Sutherland's criticisms of previous formulations 
(Sutherland, Novel Disseisin, supra note 44, 10). 
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The terms demonstrate the concerns. Property rights, not yet con-
ceptualized, were not the motivating considerations. Chapter 4 considers 
three separate categories of people. The third is widows, precisely men-
tioned. The first portion refers to heiresses,49 because homage is not men-
tioned. Women, of course, could not do homage until sometime after 
1215.50 The omission of homage contrasts sharply with the directions to the 
second category: the underage heir. The underage heir had to do homage; 
the heredes of the first category only paid relief and did whatever else was 
required. Moreover, the mention of heirs in the plural raises the presumption 
of heiresses instead of heirs. Males succeeded by primogeniture, that is, 
there would be only one heir. If there were only daughters, however, there 
would be plural heirs: heiresses. 5 1 And indeed, in mentioning minor males, 
the language is in the singular. Chapter 4 concerned the survivors of a 
deceased tenant, but mentioned only heiresses, minor heirs, and widows. 
Chapter 5 dealt with the disciplining of already accepted tenants. The 
provision established a time limit for its application: only disseisins occur-
ring after the king's arrival back in England after the peace was made were 
affected. 52 The reference to disseisins carried out against the assize is some-
what oracular. 53 Chapter 5 involved some protection for accepted tenants 
against disciplinary actions. Handling accepted tenants as a matter distinct 
49. Warren, Henry II, supra note 32, 344 notes the problem with the plural form of heres, 
but refers it to the family collectively ['Clearly the concern here was to prevent the 
disseisin of the deceased family (referred to collectively as 'the heirs') before the formal 
installation of the rightful heir'], even though younger son and daughters could not be 
considered an heir, nor could the widow. Milsom did not see the significance of the 
plural form of 'heres', since he transformed the plural nouns and verbs into the singular 
form when quoting the Assize. Milsom, Legal Framework, 164. Nevertheless, he later 
paraphrased the provision correctly, although he omits the doweress provision. Mil-
som, Historical Foundations, 135. Milsom supposes that the problem leading to the 
Assize might have been the demand for excessive reliefs. Ibid., 135. This explanation 
separates the provision from any concern over the recent war. The solution suggested 
here reconciles the normal security of holdings with the social and political context. 
Note that the first recorded payments for writs of mort d' ancestor sought the wife's 
inheritance. D. Stenton, English Justice, supra note 48, 44. 
50. Glanvill, IX.!; Pollock and Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, I :305-306. 
51. Stenton, English Feudalism, supra note 2, 39 (the divided succession of daughters the 
subject of a 'statutum decretum' in Stephen's reign; see Milsom's perceptive comment 
about the moral tone of the provision: Milsom, 'Inheritance by Women', 78); Glanvill, 
Vll.l2. 
52. Palmer, 'Feudal Framework', 1151-53; Sutherland, Novel Disseisin, supra note 44, 10. 
53. The problem is that the first surviving form of the writ of novel disseisin is in Glanvill, 
ca. 1188. The date for the provision of the writ is thus conjectural. Sutherland argues 
for a writ of novel disseisin from at least 1176 and probably from a decade or more 
earlier: Sutherland, Novel Disseisin, supra note 44, 7-9. John Beckerman has argued 
for a later origin (John Beckerman, 'Review of Sutherland, The Assize of Novel Dis-
seisin', Yale Law Journa/83 (1974), 625-29, as have I (Palmer, 'Feudal Framework', 
1151-53). 
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from the problems raised in chapter 4 shows the reality of the distinction 
between 'proprietary' matters and disciplinary matters: between decisions 
related to who should be accepted as a new tenant and whether this ten-
ant should continue to be tenant. 54 The concern in this part of the Assize of 
Northampton thus is the broad range of tenurial problems involving heir-
esses, widows, minor heirs (chapter 4) and already accepted tenants 
(chapter 5). 
The concerns of the Assize of Northampton were not comprehensive. 
Neither chapter 4 nor chapter 5 explicitly concerned the adult male heir. 
Yet, adult male heirs were prima facie more likely to receive protection. 
Several explanations are possible for this omission. There might have been a 
separate provision for adult male heirs. The Assize of Northampton, then, 
would only fill a gap. There is no record of any such provision, unless it was 
the writ of right. 55 The writ of right, however, did not initially protect direct 
heirs of a recently deceased tenant, but rather an outside claimant. 56 The 
writ of right, since its origin, had acquired other functions, but chapter 4 still 
is not compatible with a gap-filling function. The remedy provided, the 
assize of mort d'ancestor, would have given heiresses and minors better 
protection than adult male heirs. Finally, neither the provision for widows 
nor chapter 5 fits easily with such an explanation. Alternatively, chapter 4 
might have protected the vulnerable in society. The ascription of altruistic 
motives to rulers, however, is suspect, particularly when the social con-
sequences are significant. A more plausible explanation, then, is that chap-
ter 4 exhibits no concern for these groups as such, but concern rather for 
what lords would be doing in ignoring widows, minor heirs, or heiresses. 
The Assize of Northampton, chapters 4 and 5, was a declaration that, 
since the king and magnates had agreed to a peace, the magnates could not 
prepare for war. A lord who expected hostilities would find it politically 
acceptable to his homage group to pass over heiresses and minors perhaps in 
favor of a stranger, but more likely an adult male of the blood, although not 
a descendant. 57 He might likewise severely discipline widows who were not 
readily amenable to remarriage to an appropriate spouse. He might also deal 
more severely with assertive tenants if preparing for war rather than if 
expecting peace. But adult male heirs would be in no jeopardy. It was the 
vulnerable who would be passed over or treated rigorously. Thus, the Assize 
of Northampton was designed not to protect them, but to inhibit the mag-
54. The terminological distinction between proprietary and disciplinary decisions is Mil-
sam's. Milsom, Legal Framework, 39-44, 165. The distinction does not appear in 
words in the medieval documents. The differentiation between chapters 4 and 5 in the 
Assize of Northampton here justifies the introduction of those terms, if any justification 
were needed. 
55. Milsom, Legal Framework, 184-85; Historical Foundations, 128-36. 
56. Text supra accompanying notes 36-38. 
57. Supra note 35 (no. 3). 
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nates' power to prepare for hostilities. The concern was thus purely politi-
cal; the Assize of Northampton was not an adjustment to a (nonexistent) 
body of substantive property law. 
The political nature of the concerns leading to the Assize caused a lack of 
appreciation of the problems occasioned by the enactment. Widows would 
receive their dower as had been normal. But from whom would they hold it? 
While dower certainly had social roots, 58 the immediate rationale for allow-
ing dower from a precarious life tenure had been feudal. A widow retained 
for her own life a portion of her husband's tenement, because that was part 
of the fee: part of the price a lord had to pay to claim a man's loyalty, part of 
his obligation to his deceased man. A lord provided for his man's survivors. 
Even if the husband failed to nominate dower, the lord had an obligation to 
provide for the widow: what became at common law reasonable dower, as 
distinct from nominated dower. 59 But since lords did not take homage from 
minor heirs prior to 1176,60 the widow would not have held her dower from 
the heir: he would not be heir or be capable of having tenants until he had 
given homage. 61 While the prospective heir was underage, the widow must 
have held her dower from the lord. That custom survived for tenants-in-
chief. 62 For other widows, however, the Assize of Northampton occasioned 
58. Socage tenants certainly knew of dower rights (Pollock and Maitland, Hist. Eng.Law, 
2:421) as did customary tenants: Eleanor Searle, 'Seigneurial Control of Women's 
Marriage: The Antecedents and Function of Merchet in England', Past and Present 82 
(1979), 38-39. 
59. Glanvill, VI. 
60. Milsom, 'Inheritance by Women', 62. 
61. I know of no one who addresses this problem, but the arguments in Milsom, Legal 
Framework, 163-64, equating escheat and wardship apply with equal force in making 
the widow tenant of the lord prior to the Assize of Northampton. A few cases touch on 
the matter. Stenton, English Feudalism, supra note 2, 52-53, 91. The last case might be 
taken to indicate that a widow was holding from the heir, but that is not clear. Regesta 
Regum, (Regesta Regum, supra note 31, 3:306) only has one indexed mention of 
dower, but that entry shows the reality of the power of the lord's confirmation in 
1153-54. 
62. 'Prerogativa Regis' in Prerogativa Regis: Tertia Lectura Roberti Constable de Lyncol-
nis /nne Anno 11 H. 7, ed. S.E. Thome (New Haven, 1949), 159. The translation of the 
Latin there is: 
'4. Item, (the king] shall assign to widows after the death of their husbands who hold 
of him in chief their dower which pertains to them even if the heirs be of full age, if the 
widows want. And before the assignment of the dower, the abovesaid heirs being 
minors or of full age, those widows shall swear that they will not marry without royal 
license. And if they do, then the king shall take into his hand all the lands and 
tenements they hold of him in dower until they shall make satisfaction at the will of the 
king'. Thorne dates the Prerogativa Regis at between 1279 and 1285 (p. xl) and 
remarks (but citing only a fifteenth century reading on the tract) that the doweress still 
held of the heir (p. xxviii). The words of chapter 4, however, are quite explicit: 'omnes 
terras et tenementa que de eo tenent in dotem'. F. W. Maitland ('The 'Praerogativa 
Regis', in The Collected Papers of Frederic William Maitland, ed. H.A.L. Fisher 
(Cambridge, 1911), 2:182-89) talks about the document. Maitland, ibid., p. 189, 
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a change. When the lord took the heir's homage immediately on the death of 
the ancestor tenant, the widow would always hold of him. In some ways, 
nothing would change: the lord would be guardian of the heir and would 
look after the widow as before. Nevertheless, the tenement was now the 
heir's in some special way, so that the guardian's actions-the widow's 
allotment of dower-might be more challengeable now when the heir came 
of age. 63 Chapter 4, however, addresses none of this complexity. The con-
cern was with politics, not property. 
The purposes of the Compromise of 1153 and the Assize of Northampton 
were limited. They aimed at immediate political-military problems, not at 
erecting a state. Neither provision abolished lordly discretion or lordly disci-
pline. They only restricted lordly decision within the bounds dictated by the 
royal treaty or by peace-time standards. Even though the intention behind 
the Assize of Northampton was not monumental, the institution of regular 
supervision of feudal courts was momentous. No longer was royal interven-
tion available only to those who could interest the king or to those, decreas-
ing in number, affected by the Compromise. Royal assistance was available 
potentially to anyone who claimed a free tenement. Feudal courts now 
would be made to operate according to the peace-time norms of the feudal 
world. 
The exclusive role of political considerations in legal origins terminated 
with the Assize of Northampton. Enforcement of its provisions necessitated 
full-time justices in 1179. 64 The number of specialized justices expanded in 
the 1190s, 65 so that the justices began to act as a bureaucracy. The minor 
anomalies in Glanvil/66 presaged the beginning of genuine rules of law. 
thought that it might have been 'a document issued by the king to his serjeants', but at 
any rate thought it a respectable source for thirteenth century law. Sue Sheridan Walker 
('Feudal Constraint and Free Consent in the Making of Marriages in Medieval England: 
Widows in the King's Gift', Canadian Historical Society Papers (Ottawa, 1979), 
97-110) has examined widows. Neither addressed the question of from whom the 
widow of the tenant-in-chief held her dower while the heir was a minor in the thirteenth 
century. 
63. The position of the doweress prior to 1176 has received no systematic attention. Little 
can be gleaned from Royal Writs, supra note 36. The sources are perhaps too intractable 
for definitive analysis. It should be noted, however, that in Henry I's Coronation 
Charter (Select Charters, supra note 15, 118) the king assured his men that their wives 
would receive their dower whether they died leaving children or not: he took it as his 
duty to his own men to provide for their survivors. Dower from a life-time fee certainly 
makes more sense if it is held from the lord; but it may have been usually transferred so 
as to be held of the heir when the heir gave homage. The lord still continued to provide 
the dower when the tenant died without heir. The reason for the provision was not that 
the lord was substitute heir; he was here acting like lords prior to the Assize of 
Northampton. 
64. Warren, Henry 1/, supra note 32, 296-98. 
65. PBK, 3:1xxix-clxi. 
66. Glanvill, VII.!: the lord and heir rule dictated that descendants play musical chairs with 
the tenement to prevent the lord becoming the heir. 
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Rules of law are distinctly bureaucratic creations, since they are applied 
strictly and without regard to person or to social mores. 67 
The development of the common law rule that no man need answer for his 
free tenement without a royal writ demonstrates the impact of the bureau-
cratic judicial action. By 1205 it was a rule of law proper that no man need 
answer for his free tenement without a royal writ. As Professor Milsom has 
pointed out, 68 that maxim began as a statement of fact: a mere description of 
social relationships of power. The progression from statement of fact to 
custom and finally to rule of law measures the degree to which the political-
military decisions of 1153 and 1176 generated a bureaucratic approach to 
law. That new approach in tum created a law decreasingly congruent with 
social mores. 69 
The maxim as a statement of fact illustrates the lord's problem with the 
Compromise of 1153. On taking a man's homage, the lord was committed 
to the man, barring disloyalty. No ordinary outsider could disrupt that 
relationship. Simply as a matter of fact, then, no lord would voluntarily 
reconsider his commitment to a tenant because of an outsider's claim. Only 
special interference from outside could raise again the question of tenancy. 
That interference was normally an order from the king: a royal writ. 70 After 
1153 there was one occasion on which such a confrontation was inevitable: 
the death of a tenant leaving an heir to confront an 1135 claimant. In such a 
situation it would take a writ to make a lord consider the outsider. 
The situation became more complex if the lord accepted the heir before 
the 1135 claimant presented himself. In such a case the lord had committed 
himself; the new tenant had been selected as heir. Now the lord's own 
resources were involved, because he was obliged to provide maintenance to 
the accepted tenant whatever happened. The already familiar word for this 
obligation was escambium: exchange lands of the same value. Lords had 
occasionally committed themselves to escambium before. 71 Regular royal 
intervention in these situations, however, came in 1170, when the deforciant 
67. The statement does not apply to early, formal practices, such as the order or manner of 
speaking in court. Such matters are important to indicate mindset, but do not operate 
autonomously to produce artificial conduct at the societal level. G.D.G. Hall routinely 
translated 'generaliter verum est' as 'it is a general rule', instead of the more proper 
'generally it is true'. By present modes of analysis, that translation would be mislead-
ing. 
68. Milsom, Legal Framework, 59; Palmer, 'Feudal Framework', 1137-38. 
69. I have pursued this theme in later times in Palmer, Whitton Dispute, supra note 2. 
70. For a treatment of the maxim as a rule, see Royal Writs, supra note 36, 212-31. Donald 
Sutherland still considers that the maxim was a rule rather than a statement of fact very 
early in the reign of Henry II. D. Sutherland, 'Review of Searle, ed., The Chronicle of 
Battle Abbey', New York University Law Review 56 (1981 ), 872. The case he cites, 
however, is equally evidence for the maxim as a mere statement of fact or very early 
custom. 
71. Regesta Regum, 3:nos. 119, 150, 177, 221-26, 274-75, 300, 321, 360, 450, 473-74, 
493, 509, 512, 568, 582, 634-35, 901. 
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clause was introduced into the writ of right. 72 Prior to that time, there was 
no evidence in the writ of right that the land had been regranted: the writ 
merely ordered the lord to hold right to the claimant. 73 The deforciant 
clause, however, named a tenant, even though it was still the lord who was 
ordered to hold right to the tenant. In such a situation, the escambium 
obligation dictated indeed that a writ was required to make a lord reconsider 
the tenancy. 74 No man, indeed, would be forced to answer for his free 
tenement if the claimant did not have a royal writ. That was a statement of 
fact, not a rule of law. 
The exact progression from statement of fact to legal custom is not clear. 
The next person to whom the statement could apply was the widow; by the 
time such cases arose the statement had become a custom. A standardized 
writ of right of dower probably followed the Assize of Northampton, per-
haps accompanied by the writ of dower unde nichil habet ('whereof she has 
nothing'). 75 The third writ, however, is the one relevant here. When an heir, 
now adult, claimed that too much dower had been allotted to the widow, he 
was unable to challenge her in his own court. That downward looking plea 
was to be held in the county court pursuant to a writ of admeasurement of 
dower: 76 the claimant wanted to reduce his obligations to an accepted 
tenant. That was just: his lord as guardian might have allocated her dower 
too generously. 77 The venue for admeasurement of dower, however, was 
the county court. The heir could not challenge her in his own court. She had 
done nothing wrong, so his action was not disciplinary. 78 His proceeding 
against the widow was a reconsideration of the proprietary decision: who 
should properly be tenant. But in this situation also, then, no man (woman) 
would have to answer for his (her) free tenement without a royal writ. The 
maxim probably did not determine the venue for admeasurement of dower. 
72. Royal Writs, supra note 36, 212. 
73. Supra note 36; Palmer, 'Feudal Framework', 1141-42. 
74. An honest or politically sensitive lord would have occasionally voluntarily honored a 
dual obligation, if only by supplying one or the other with an heiress. 
75. Glanvill, Vl.5, 15. The writ of right of dower was appropriate for a widow who already 
had part of her dower; the proper venue was the lord's court. Unde nichil habet was for 
the widow who had not been acknowledged and thus had none of her dower yet; the 
proper venue was the king's court. 
76. Ibid., Vl.l7-18. 
77. CRR, 16:1766 (1242); Pollock and Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, 2:422. 
78. One might contend that the situation was analogous to purpresture. Purpresture (Gian-
vill, IX.Il-13) was treated as a feudal felony: stealing from the lord by enlarging the 
tenement. Purpresture resulted in forfeiture of the whole tenement, not merely that part 
that had been added to one's tenement by the purpresture. Acceptance of an excessive 
dower, however, was not like purpresture. The doweress had been seised of the ex-
cessive portion: had been installed by the lord. Any wrong here was on the part of the 
heir's lord, who as guardian was probably responsible for most excessive allocations. 
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Perhaps no one perceived the situation as a possible example of its work-
ings. Nevertheless, lords could not proceed in their own courts against 
accepted tenants to reduce their tenements. 
In Glanvill (ca.ll88) the statement of fact had clearly become custom. It 
appeared in that treatise twice, but in different forms. The difference in 
formulation suggests that it was not properly a rule: a rule of law is normally 
characterized by a set formula. The first mention in Glanvill comes in the 
introduction to the writs of right patent in the context of a claim against a 
lord who already had a tenant: 
When anyone claims any free tenement or service to be held from another by 
free service, he will not be able to draw the tenant into the plea without a writ 
from the lord king or his justice. Therefore he shall have a writ of right, 
directed to the lord of whom he claims to hold. . . . 79 
The situation envisaged in the second statement is not clear, but the differ-
ence in the formulation is important in showing that the custom was not yet a 
rule. 
It should be known, moreover, that according to the custom of the realm, no 
one is bound to answer concerning any free tenement of his in the court of his 
lord, unless there is a writ from the lord king or his chief justice. 80 
Both statements suppose a lord who had already granted the land to a third 
party or was himself claiming against the tenant as part of his inheritance: 
they did not concern lords exercising disciplinary powers. When consider-
ing disciplinary activities Glanvill stated explicitly that the lord could pro-
ceed 'as of right and without any precept from the lord king or the chief 
justice' .81 The maxim, at this point, then, left the lord's disciplinary powers 
intact and related solely to proprietary matters. Still at the time of Glanvill 
then, the custom left lords with discipline while regulating proprietary mat-
ters. 
Disciplinary activity, of course, had ultimate proprietary consequences; 
its severity made it the focus of real power. A tenant who wrongfully 
appropriated a parcel of his lord's land forfeited not only that parcel, but all 
the tenements held from that lord. 82 Likewise, withholding service entailed 
forfeiture of the whole fee held of that lord, not just that portion from which 
the service issued. 83 Violence against the lord, an heiress's incontinence, or 
a father's giving of his likely heiress in marriage without consent likewise 
79. Glanvill, Xll.2. 
80. Ibid., XII.25. 
81. Ibid., IX.8; see also IX.l. 
82. Ibid., IX.l3. 
83. Ibid., IX.l ('Si vero super hoc convictus fuerit tenens ipse, de iure de toto feodo quod 
de domino illo suo tenet exheredabitur' .) 
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entailed forfeiture. 84 Lordly power depended on discipline: any tenant who 
did not live up to expectations would simply forfeit. Disciplinary power was 
all important; proprietary matters were important, but comparatively minor. 
The custom seems to have applied in proprietary matters, but not in discipli-
nary matters, as late as 1188. 85 
By 1195, however, the assize of novel disseisin was interfering with the 
lord's disciplinary power. Novel disseisin derived from royal contempt pro-
ceedings for treaty violations. It had been formalized into a standardized 
writ shortly before 1188 86 and remedied disseisins of free tenements made 
unjustly and without judgment. 87 When the number of justices increased in 
1194,88 novel disseisin became the instrument that undermined lordly con-
trol. A prior, for instance, by judgment of his court declared a tenement 
forfeit for default of service. The tenant brought an assize of novel disseisin, 
in which the court of the prior supported the prior's account. Instead of 
ruling for the prior, as would accord with Glanvill, the court mandated that 
the land be returned and that the prior give him a day in his court to plead 
about the services. 89 Two more such cases appear in 1199.90 Distraint and 
forfeiture of the fee, while not necessarily punished, were no longer 
allowed. . 
At about the same time the nature of 'seisin' and 'free tenement' began to 
diverge from social expectations, albeit marginally. They became legal 
categories by the workings of the assize of novel disseisin. If the justices did 
anything but submit the questions to the assize panel for resolution-and 
they often did-they had to resolve first the questions relating to the nature 
of a free tenement and the lawful possession (seisin) required before one 
could be disseised. By 1200 the answer to the latter question-the nature of 
seisin-was that anyone who had some colorable installation would be 
seised for the purposes of the assize. 91 
That resolution of the scope of seisin for purposes of the assize around 
1200 was momentous in that it separated title from lordly acceptance. 92 The 
84. Ibid., VII.I2, IX.I. 
85. Milsom, Legal Framework, 55. 
86. Supra note 53. 
87. See generally Sutherland, Novel Disseisin, supra note 44, and Milsom, Legal 
Framework, 8-35. 
88. PBK, 3: lxxix-clxi. 
89. PRS XIV, 134. 
90. RCR., I :366; 2:294. 
91. Milsom, Legal Framework, 21-25, 46-47. 
92. Title and lordly acceptance were somewhat separated by the Compromise of 1153, but 
title was still based on lordly acceptance at some prior date: Palmer, 'Feudal 
Framework', 1149. 
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Countess Amice case93 concerned a tenant who had been installed in part of 
the Countess's marriage portion by her husband. When that marriage was 
dissolved, the Countess had no obligation to that tenant: he was on the land 
without proper warrant. By judgment of her court, she ejected him. In an 
assize of novel disseisin, however, he regained the tenement. Against the 
testimony of the Countess's court, he proved by compurgation that he had 
not willingly entered into the plea or vouched her supposed husband to 
warranty. 94 The tenant regained his tenement and knew he could refuse with 
impunity to enter into a plea unless the Countess had a royal writ to make 
him answer. No royal writ was available, however, that would allow the 
case to come in the Countess's court. Since she was the claimant, her writ of 
right would be directed to her lord and would thus come in her lord's 
court. 95 She was thus prevented from acting against him in her own court. In 
such proprietary matters, no man need answer for his free tenement without 
a royal writ, because tenants colorably, but wrongfully, installed had seisin 
such that they could utilize the assize of novel disseisin. 
By 1200, then, the need for a royal writ to make the tenant of a free 
tenement answer was a rule of law. As a statement of fact at the beginning of 
the reign of Henry II, it was an expression of the solidarity between lord and 
man against outsiders: not a legal, but a social phenomenon. In the 1180s, 
the venue for admeasurement of dower and Glanvill' s statements indicate 
that the statement had become custom. It was not proper to allow a warran-
tor to proceed to diminish an accepted tenant's tenement in his own court: 
the case went rather to the county court. Nevertheless, everyone involved 
admitted that the widow was a tenant in good standing who had been 
properly installed, although with an excessive dower. The results were not 
at odds with social mores. By 1200, a tenant without right had the benefit of 
the rule, now decisively turned against the lord. No longer was it a maxim 
about normal social solidarity. Nor was it a consideration of seemliness that 
worked no anomalies. By 1200 the rule, enforced by novel disseisin, was 
insulating the tenant from his lord and protecting tenants who had no right. 
Moreover, and more vitally, the assize functioned to limit the lord's 
disciplinary powers short of disinheritance, so that lordly control became 
'mere' discipline, without the ultimate impact on tenants that had made the 
disciplinary power so much more important than proprietary decision-
making. After the disciplinary powers were limited, proprietary decisions 
assumed greater importance, but lords had already lost control over that 
sector when it had been less significant. The reality was that tenants were 
93. PBK, 1:3199; RCR, 2:180; CRR., 1:186, 225, 249. For analysis, see Milsom, Legal 
Framework, 45-47. 
94. CRR., I: 186 records him pleading that he was not summoned, did not come into court 
by summons, did not vouch to warranty, and did not lose his seisin by judgment of the 
countess's court. But the court decided that he should take issue on not having entered 
into the plea willingly and vouching: a somewhat different position. 
95. Glanvill, Xll.8; Milsom, Legal Framework, 92; Palmer, 'Feudal Framework', 1138. 
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increasingly insulated from their lords: impersonal rules dictated decisions 
concerning tenures. Land left the sphere of personal relationships and be-
came property. 96 
Likewise by 1200 legal procedure fitted a new conceptualization: a hierar-
chy of possessory and proprietary actions. Prior to 1176 the various pro-
cedures were correlative: meant for different people and situations, not for 
the same person to be used successively. The writ of right was thus for the 
outside 1135 claimant; the disseisin remedy, for the Stephen analogue: the 
current tenant. Different people thus often properly had jus (right) and 
seisin.97 The writs corresponded to social situations. But when standardized 
writs proliferated, possible litigants perceived that the general forms dic-
tated by standardization enabled them to utilize the writs successively. 98 The 
possibility of a possessory-proprietary hierarchy perhaps sprang from the 
relationship of the assize of darrein presentment to the writ of right of 
advowson. Darrein presentment determined who would nominate the next 
occupant of an ecclesiastical position by determining who or whose ancestor 
had last presented. That was necessarily a fast determination, because the 
bishop simply made the appointment without a presentment if the position 
remained vacant for six months. The more complex matter of right could be 
settled by writ of right of advowson after the apparent rightful patron had 
presented for this one time: a clear possessory-proprietary hierarchy dictated 
by ecclesiastical pressures. 99 The Countess Am ice case shows that this 
hierarchy now applied also to the assize of novel disseisin and the writ of 
right. As between the same parties and in the same dispute, the results 
would be different depending on the writ: the result of the possessory writ 
would be for the tenant, but would be reversed by the decision on the writ of 
right. The law then was set in a tiered form of remedies that enabled and 
encouraged multiple cases in the same dispute. 
The Writs of Entry 1: The Legal Conceptualization 
The writs of entry came to occupy a position between the assizes and the 
writ of right in the .hierarchy of writs. They delved more deeply into 'title' 
than did the assizes, but not as deeply as the writ of right. Each writ of entry 
alleged a single flaw in the tenant's title, whereas the writ of right normally 
determined broadly who had greater right. The focus of the writs of entry 
allowed the claimant both to direct the jury precisely to the major point in 
the dispute and to avoid the cumbersome process of the writ of right. 
Finally, proceedings on a writ of entry were not final: a defective decision 
96. Milsom, Legal Framework, 183-86. 
97. Palmer, 'Feudal Framework', 1149. 
98. Palmer, Whilton Dispute, supra note 2, 15-17. The standardization of writs was at least 
as important as the provision of returnable writs. 
99. Pollock and Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, I: 148. 
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on a writ of entry could be cured by a proper decision on a writ of right. 
These writs eventually relegated the writ of right to only an occasional 
phenomenon. 
In the emerging legal system, the writs of entry were thus vitally im-
portant; the reasons and ways they developed are complex. Maitland consid-
ered these writs property remedies even at origins. This framework for the 
writs supposes a horizontal world: an owner simply challenged a point of a 
tenant's title. Milsom insists that feudal structures, now distorted by the 
king's court, form the proper context for analyzing the writs. The writs of 
entry were thus initially downward-looking writs: lords looking downward 
and challenging their tenants in the king's court now that they could not do 
so in their own courts. In that framework, 'entry' does not connote an 
owner's attitude toward property, but rather an offense against the lord on 
account of an unjustified assumption of a personal relationship. 100 Maitland 
did not perceive the social context, but Milsom's model does not resolve the 
question about the writs. An accurate account of both the social and legal 
context requires resolution of three distinct but interrelated problems: the 
legal conceptualization of the writs of entry, the development of their forms, 
and the rationale for their provision. 
Ascertaining the legal conceptualization of the writs of entry is a very 
technical task, but one that shows the declining power of feudal courts and 
thus the increasing cohesiveness of England as a governmental unit. Chan-
cery utilized a single model in formulating these writs. From the claimant's 
point of view, the writ was 'upward-downward': a triangular construct 
corresponding to the nature of litigation in the recently feudal society. 101 
The crucial question is thus the position of the lord: he always had a place, 
either as an explicit actor or as an explicitly excluded actor. Establishing that 
model likewise determines those situations in which lords could no longer 
act. In a succeeding article, that conclusion will provide essential data for 
the determination of the economic impact of the origins of the common law. 
Two rules governing the writs of entry provide the legal conceptualiza-
tion: the per and cui rule and the rule limiting the vouching of warrantors. 
The per and cui rule is the more interesting, because it seems arbitrary. The 
second rule will be treated later. 102 The per and cui rule limited access to the 
writs of entry by determining the reach of the writs: by limiting the kind of 
person who could be sued. The limitation related to devolutions of the land: 
the number of people through whose hands the land had passed since depart-
ing from the claimant or his ancestor (called the propositus). The writ had to 
link the current tenant back to the claimant or his propositus mentioning 
every intermediate holder using the words per (by) and cui (to whom) no 
I 00. My previous inconclusive resolution of the nature of the writs of entry (Palmer, 'Feudal 
Framework', 1153-61) derived from a failure to distinguish the questions. 
101. Milsom, Legal Framework, 72-74. 
102. Text infra accompanying notes 173-183. 
26 Law and History Review 
more than once each. No one has ever made any jurisprudential sense of the 
rule. toJ 
The most important writ of entry, ad terminum qui preteriit ('for a term 
that has expired'), illustrates the rule. This writ allowed claimants to recover 
against tenants holding over after an expired lease. The writ, at maximum 
reach, follows. 104 
The king to the sheriff, greeting. Command Tertius that justly and without 
delay he render to Claimant ten acres of land with appurtenances in Whilton 
into which he has no entry save by [PER] Secundus, the father of the said 
Tertius, whose heir he is, to whom [CUI] Propositus, father of Claimant, 
whose heir he is, gaged them for a term which has expired, as he says. And if 
he does not (so render) ... then summon Tertius etc. 
(cui) 
Propositus----------------------__. Secundus I I (per) 
Claimant Tertius 
This writ was at maximum reach, since it used both per and cui. Had Tertius 
died leaving a son Quartus on the land, Quartus could not have been linked 
to Propositus using only per and cui: the writ could not connect Secundus 
with Propositus. Claimant thus had to use a writ of right to challenge 
103. Bracton, 3:159-60 (f. 219b) Bracton probably did not quite understand the legal con-
ceptualization, although he talked about the writs reaching the third person inclusively: 
'This writ will lie against strangers who have entered through a disseisor, one or 
several, as far as the degrees of entry and the persons permit, as well as against the heirs 
of the disseisor or those who have their entry through the heirs, as far as the third person 
inclusively'. This was only in the context of sur disseisin, an obviously three-handed 
writ. Note, however, that Bracton did treat the vouching rule immediately after this 
treatment of the degrees, so that he may have thought there was some connection). 
Britton, ed. F.M. Nichols (Washington, 1901), 565-70 (an explanation of the way to 
count the degrees); Fleta seu Commentarius Juris Anglicani (London, 1647), 361-64 
(Book 5.35) (rendition of the writs and method of counting the degrees); Sir Arthur 
Fitzherbert, The New Na/llra Brevium (London, 1687), 201; William Blackstone, Com-
mentaries on the Laws of England, I st ed. facsimile (Chicago and London, 1979), 
3: 180-82; Pollock and Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law 2:65-66, 71 n (the latter hypothesizes 
some relationship between the degrees and the vouching rule, but concludes: 'There is 
something to be discovered in this obscure region; we cannot profess to have thor-
oughly explored it. It is darkened by inconsistent methods of counting the degrees'.); 
S.F.C. Milsom, Introduction to Novae Narrationes, cxxxiv-cxxxvii; S.F.C. Milsom, 
Historical Foundations of the Common Law, 1st ed. (London, 1969), 121-24 (p. 121: 
'The writs of entry may therefore have started within the feudal framework; and this 
origin may explain a major mystery to which they were subject, that of the "de-
grees".'); Milsom, Historical Foundations 144-46, 148-49 (see infra note 107). 
104. See Registers, 10 (Hib. 25). The writ was apparently available at full reach from the 
beginning: PBK, I :3506. 
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Quartus. But, had Secundus still held the land, Claimant could use a writ of 
entry, since he could be related back, although only using per. Writs of 
entry were framed only in the per or in the per and cui. After 1267 situations 
such as that involving Quartus were made subject to writs of entry utilizing 
the word post (after), 105 but that later development is irrelevant here. Such 
writs were said to be framed 'within the degrees'. Prior to 1267, in the 
formative period, the workings of the per and cui rule thus determined the 
reach of the writs of entry. 
An anomalous application of this straight-forward, seemingly senseless 
rule suggests a social-legal context to the writs of entry. The per and cui rule 
found two, but only two, applications. The operation of the rule considered 
normal is that the writ of entry could reach only the first or second holder: 
the writ could list only two people beyond propositus. The writ of entry ad 
terminum qui preteriit above is such a two-handed writ. Without any con-
temporary comment, however, the same rule allowed certain writs of entry 
to mention three people after propositus. 106 A highly technical, seemingly 
scribal rule ought not vary· in application unless there is a perception that 
rationalizes the rule: that makes the different applications embody the same 
principle. 
That perception concerns the position of the lord in the writ. The three-
handed writs-those that mentioned three holders after propositus-were 
actually the norm. In three-handed writs, the lord was always the first 
person through whose hands the land passed after propositus. 107 Three-
handed writs thus fitted those situations in which Claimant's lord had him-
self separated the land from Claimant's line. In two-handed writs, however, 
the lord was omitted: he had done nothing and was not involved in the initial 
transfer. The two-handed writs were a concrete reflection of the lord's loss 
of control in specific social situations. The model thus measures lordly 
control: the appearance of the writ indicates, but did not cause that decline in 
control. 
The writ of entry concerning a guardian's alienation is one of the earliest 
of the six three-handed writs of entry. Its tenurial orientation is clear. 108 
105. Statute of Marlborough, c. 29 (52 Henry III, 1267). 
106. Supra note 103. 
107. Milsom correctly identified the crucial question as the position of the lord in the 
formula. Milsom, Legal Framework, 92-102. He likewise suspects that the position of 
the lord related to the per and cui rule: Milsom, Historical Foundations, 148 ('can the 
"downward" nature of the writs of entry throw light on the mysterious "degrees"?'). 
Nevertheless, he identified Claimant as the relevant lord making a downward claim, so 
that he assumed the writ would mirror the social fact, whereas the writ followed the 
legal conceptualization of the process demanded by the structure of the writs. He 
thought the per and cui rule still mysterious and perhaps related to the degrees in 
maritagium (Milsom, Historical Foundations, 148-49). The degrees in the writs of 
entry, however, were completely distinct from the degrees in maritagium. 
108. Registers, 95 (CC. 198); Bracton, 4:38, lists only two-handed varieties of the wardship 
entry writ. Early writs were also three-handed. Two early cases have minor claimants, 
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The king to the sheriff, greetings. Command Tertius that ... he render to 
Claimant, who is of full age as it is said, ten acres ... which he claims to be 
his right and inheritance and into which the said Tertius has no entry save by 
[PER] Secundus, to whom [CUI] Primus demised them, who had only the 
wardship thereof while the aforesaid Claimant was underage, as he says ... 
Primus 
Claimant 
~ui) 
Secundus 
(per) I 
Tertius 
Primus in this writ was not Propositus. Had Propositus been in the wardship 
of Primus, Claimant could still have reached Tertius with the writ. Primus 
here was the guardian. In the early cases the guardian would inevitably have 
been the lord or one occupying the lord's place. 109 The tenurial orientation 
of the writ is thus complex: from Claimant to Primus it is upward; but 
Primus made a downward grant thereafter to Secundus. The social situation 
that necessitated the writ will be treated later. 110 The legal conceptualization 
of the writ is that the guardian granted away his ward's lands as if they had 
been his own. The writ allowed Claimant to regain his lands despite his 
lord's actions. The legal model is thus 'upward-downward': upward to the 
lord, downward to Secundus, who left it or alienated it to Tertius. 
The form of the early writ Cui in vita ('whom in his Iifetime') 111 confirms 
the model. Cui in vita allowed a widow to reclaim her inheritance, marriage 
portion or dower regardless of the alienation by her late husband. The 
purchaser could then claim escambium from the husband's heir. 112 This writ 
has always been considered two-handed, 113 but the form reveals rather a 
three-handed writ: the husband/lord is Primus. 114 
so they were presumably not bringing a writ of right but a writ of entry: CRR, 3:92-93, 
114 (1204) (showing that although the legal conceptualization was upward-downward, 
the social situation was downward); CRR, 4:60, 115, 122-23, 141, 221-222 (1206) (for 
the form of the writ, see Palmer, 'Feudal Framework', 1155, note 56). Other examples 
of three-handed guardian writs of entry: CRR, 7:238, 291 (1214); CRR, 8:230 (1220). 
109. A sale of the wardship to another may not have had to have been recounted in the writ. 
CRR, II :2040. 
I 10. Infra text accompanying notes 173-94. 
Ill. The writ was certainly available by 1213: Palmer, 'Feudal Framework', 1155. It may 
have been available in 1212: CRR, 6:399. The first writ at full reach I have found is 
CRR, 8:110, 329 (1219). See also CRR, 11:208. The writ was also available for the 
recovery of dower, a mere free tenement: CRR, 13:693 (1228). 
112. Bracton, 4:32. 
113. Milsom, Introduction to Novae Narrationes, cxxxv-cxxxvi: 'the degrees will 
accommodate only one holder between the propositus and the tenant. This seems to be 
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Command Tertius that ... he render to Claimant ten acres . . into which 
he has no entry save by [PER] Secundus, to whom [CUI] Primus, late hus-
band of the said Claimant, demised them, whom she was not able to con-
tradict in his lifetime ... 
29 
. -------------Primus (cui) Claimant·~ (husband~ Secundus 
~~ ~ I 
Tertius 
Cui in vita could only be a two-handed writ by the ecclesiastical theory that 
man and wife are one flesh. 115 Had husband and wife really been considered 
one, the husband could have alienated his wife's lands absolutely. In fact, 
the widow could reclaim such alienations. Husband and wife were not 
identical at law. Moreover, Primus was not propositus: the widow did not 
derive her title from him, but rather from her ancestors. Primus here was the 
lord, precisely as in the guardian writ. 116 For these purposes a wife was like 
a minor in wardship, with all consequential benefits and burdens. The ten-
urial orientation of the writ, thus, was clearly 'upward-downward'. 
Analysis of sur cui in vita confirms the structure of cui in vita. Sur cui in 
vita was a remedy for the heir of a woman whose husband had alienated her 
land while she was still alive. 117 If her heir was not also the husband's heir, 
true of ad terminum qui preteriit already considered, dum nonfuit compos mentis, dum 
fuit infra etatem, sine assensu capituli, and cui in vita. But it is not true of writs based 
on disseisin, or intrusion, in which the degrees tum out to accommodate two persons 
between propositus and tenant, the disseisor or intrudor and another'. The error relates 
not to the actual reach, but only as to who is propositus. 
114. Registers, 10 (Hib. 26: in the per), 292 (R. 795: in the per and cui). For an early writ in 
the per and cui, see supra note Ill. 
115. J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 2nd ed. (London, 1979), 395. 
116. The husband appears as lord in at least two other situations. A wife who opposed 
alienation of her nominated dower land could not reclaim it after the husband's death 
(opposition apparently being equated to feudal felony), whereas if she consented, 
paradoxically, she could recover it: Glanvill, VI.3. Likewise, a wife who killed her 
husband was guilty of petty treason: Baker, English Legal History, supra note 115, 
395. Two early situations in which a cui in vita formula appeared (although not in a cui 
in vita writ) reflect the obligation found in Glanvill, by expanding the formula to 'cui 
non potuit vel debuit contradicere': CRR, 1:142 (1200); 4:43 (1205). The latter case 
and others describe the wife as being in the wardship custodia of the husband: CRR, 
4:43 ('custos terre cum Alicia uxore'); 2:221 ('custos hereditatis matris sue'); 8: 152; 
Milsom, 'Inheritance by Women', 85-86. 
117. Registers 292 (R. 797, in the per for husband's alienee), 293 (R.798, in the per and cui 
for husband's alienee's alienee). Early possible examples of sur cui in vita are CRR, 
8:72 (1219); 10:47 (1221); and Rolls of the Justices in Eyre for Yorkshire, 1218-19, ed. 
30 Law and History Review 
he could reclaim with the same assurance as the widow herself could with 
cui in vita. If the claimant was heir to both husband and wife, he was barred 
from recovery by his obligation to warrant his father's grants. 118 The dis-
tinction between Propositus and Primus is clear: when the husband was a 
possible propositus for Claimant, Claimant could not use the writ. In sur cui 
in vita the wife was proposita. The husband was Primus: lord of his wife. 
Both cui in vita and sur cui in vita thus fit the model suggested by the writ of 
entry concerning a guardian's alienations: the first hand in the writ was lord, 
followed by at most two tenants. 
The writ cui ante divorcium ('whom before the divorce') mirrored cui in 
vita. It provided a remedy for a woman whose marriage had been annulled 
after her supposed husband had alienated her lands. This writ was three-
handed. 119 A two-handed writ in this situation was conceivable: it would 
have asserted that the man had never really been Claimant's husband and 
lord. The law here, however, analyzed the relationship between the 
parties. 120 The man had been husband and lord to all intents and purposes, 
and the writ so describes him: 'formerly husband of the said Claimant'. This 
writ then, like cui in vita, will reach the (supposed) husband's alienee's 
alienee. Countess Amice would have used this writ had it been available; it 
was only provided, however, later in the thirteenth century. 
Command Tertius that ... he render to Claimant ten acres ... into which 
he has not entry save by [PER] Secundus, to whom [CUI] Primus, formerly 
husband of the said Claimant, who demised them to him, whom she was not 
able to contradict before the divorce pronounced between them, as she says. 
D.M. Stenton, Selden Society, vol. 56 (London, 1937), no. 167 (-no. 1132). All of 
these reach only to Secundus. 
118. Bracton, 4:33. See CRR, 15:1840, ad terminum qui preteriit, which shows that a son 
may not be barred from claiming his inheritance from his mother's side by a grant from 
his father, when the son had no inheritance from the father. 
119. Registers, 293 (R. 800: in the per, but with a note that it can be made in all the degrees); 
Registrum Brevium (London, 1687), 233 (a writ in the per, with a note that it can also 
be made in the cui. Cases of cui ante divorcium are rare: Public Record Office London 
CP. 40170, m. 31 (1278); CP. 40/135, m. 226; JUST. 11956, m. 15 (in the;ost). Th~ 
situation, although not the writ, shows up much earlier. Countess Amice, text supra 
accompanying notes 93-95, would have used such a writ had it been available, and see 
CRR, 4:274. CRR, 14:1549 seems to be a situation related to the Amice situation, but 
more in the nature of cui in vita than cui ante divorcium. CRR, 16:2411 (1242) (in the 
per for husband's alienee) is a writ cui in vita, but for a cui ante divorcium situation. 
The only problem with using cui in vita is that the writ assumed the death of the 
husband. That incongruity was not raised in the 1242 case, but probably eventually 
gave rise to the writ cui ante divorcium. 
120. For a similar approach to a writ of entry, see R.C. Palmer, 'Contexts of Marriage in 
Medieval England: Evidence from the King's Court circa 1300', Speculum 59 (1984), 
61-62. 
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Claimant 
---------------Primus (cui) (husband~ Secundus 
(per) I 
Tertius 
The same model explains the writ of entry concerned with grants by a 
tenant in curtesy, 121 again not hitherto identified as a three-handed writ. 122 
The situation was similar to that in sur cui in vita except that the husband's 
grant was made after the wife's death, while the husband was holding his 
wife's heritable lands for the remainder of his life, because they had had 
children. Once again, the writ was clearly three-handed: Primus was not 
propositus, was not the person from whom Claimant derived his title. Pri-
mus was husband and lord of proposita. This writ also followed a tenurial 
orientation that was upward-downward: up to a lord, downward then to his 
grantees. 123 
. . . Command Tertius that ... he render to Claimant ten acres ... into 
which he has no entry save by [PER] Secundus, to whom [CUI] Primus 
demised them, who held it by the law of England [=by curtesy] after the 
death of Proposita, late his wife, etc. 
Propos ita 
I 
Claimant 
Primus ~(cui) 
(husband) 
Secundus 
(per) I 
Tertius 
The writ of entry sur disseisin was likewise a three-handed writ. 124 The 
writ was provided in 1204, 125 but was not used as frequently as the guardian 
I 21. This writ was apparently not available prior to Magna Carta. The only pre-1215 
possibility I found is CRR, 7: I 09, but that is just as likely a writ of right. It does appear 
in Bracton, 4:37-38. 
122. Supra note 117. 
123. Bracton, 4:37-38; Brevia Placitata, ed. G.J. Turner, Selden Society, vol. 66 (London, 
1951), 198. Registers, 298 contains only the immediate writs provided by the Statute of 
Westminster II, c. 24 that allowed the heir to claim immediately on a grant in fee made 
by the tenant in the curtesy. 
124. Registers, 95 (CC. 197); G.D.G. Hall, 'The Early History of Entry Sur Disseisin', 
TulaneLawReview42 (1968), 584. The first writ at full reach was in 1230 (ibid., 594). 
CRR, 14:49 deserves consideration also, although it may not have been a writ sur 
disseisin. It was at least a continuation of the action after the disseisee died. 
125. Hall, 'Sur Disseisin', supra note 124, 586. 
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writ in the early decades. 126 The situation in the writ, however, is fully 
analogous to that of the other three-handed writs. The typical, but not the 
only anticipated, disseisor was the lord. That much appears from the writ of 
novel disseisin itself127 and the analysis of the Compromise of 115 3 and the 
Assize of Northampton above. 128 Sur disseisin alleged that the claimant or 
his ancestor had been disseised. Thus, the assertion that Primus here was 
conceptually the lord is hardly surprising. The number of cases in which a 
disseisor granted away the lands now makes more sense: he had never 
intended to hold the land in demesne, but was only installing a different 
tenant. 
The king to the sheriff, greetings. Command Tertius that ... he render to 
Claimant ten acres ... into which he has no entry save by [PER] Secundus, 
to whom [CUI] Primus demised them, who disseised the said Claimant un-
justly thereof etc. 
Primus/disseisor-------- ' 
---------.!..cui) 
Claimant · Secundus 
(per) I 
Tertius 
The difference between this writ and the guardian writ is that in sur disseisin 
the lord deprived an adult instead of a ward. In 1275 sur disseisin subsumed 
the guardian writ. 129 After that time the guardian writ disappeared: depriva-
tion of a minor was a disseisin. 130 The guardian writ, useful in the early 
decades, was then almost forgotten: it is not listed among three-handed 
writs, although sur disseisin is. 131 
The model generated by the three-handed writs is compelling. Previously 
three-handed writs seemed exceptional. Now cui in vita, sur cui in vita, cui 
126. It seems that earlier strictures about using sur disseisin as an important part of the 
history of the writs of entry because of its infrequent use are incorrect. It was in-
frequently used only when compared to ad terminum qui preteriit, cui in vita, and the 
guardian writ of entry. 
127. Milsom, Legal Framework, 11-13; Palmer, 'Feudal Framework', 1150. 
128. Text supra accompanying notes 31-63. 
129. Novae Narrationes, cxxxiii. 
130. T.F.T. Plucknett, Legislation of Edward I (Oxford, 1962), 81-82. 
131. Registers, 95, 98 (CC. 198, CC. 206a) are the only writs of entry through the guardian 
in that collection; register R did not include the writ; Registrum Brevium (London, 
1687), 231 only has a note that the writ has been superseded by sur disseisin. Supra 
note 113. 
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ante divorcium, the guardian writ, and the curtesy writ have been added to 
the corpus of the three-handed writs. Each three-handed writ follows an 
upward-downward pattern. In each the first hand was the claimant's or 
ancestor's lord. Cui in vita and the guardian writ were used frequently. 132 
The number and importance of three-handed writs makes that model the 
norm. The model thus establishes the oddity of the two-handed writs. The 
oddity, however, was not that their reach was shorter. Both two-handed and 
three-handed writs reached Tertius, although no formulary used the Primus-
Secundus-Tertius form to indicate that. Two-handed writs eliminated not 
Tertius, but Primus. This omission was proper because the lord no longer 
participated in the social situation. Analysis of the two-handed writs from 
this perspective establishes that the existence of two-handed writs of entry 
demonstrates the diminution of lord's power in specific situations. 
The writ causa matrimonii prelocuti ('by reason of a marriage arranged') 
was a genuinely two-handed writ. 133 The writ supposed that the woman 
claimant had given her land to her expected future husband. He then de-
clined to marry her, but retained the land. This writ allowed her to recover. 
The man here is not analogous to the husband in cui in vita or sur cui vita: in 
causa matrimonii prelocuti he never actually became the woman's husband 
and lord. The man, therefore, cannot be Primus: he must rather be Secun-
dus. There is no Primus in the writ. But if the expected husband was thus 
Secundus and the writ still reached Tertius, the reach of this two-handed 
writ was identical to that of the three-handed writs. The form of the writ 
helps. 
Command Tertius that ... he render to Claimant ten acres ... into which 
he has not entry save by [PER] Secundus, to whom [CUI] Claimant demised 
them because of a marriage arranged between them whereby he should have 
taken her to wife, and he has not yet taken her, as she says, etc. 
(cui) 
Claimant --------'---------- Secundus/expected husband 
(per) I 
Tertius 
132. Frequency is a relative matter with writs of entry. Between 1233 and 1242 (CRR, 15 
and CRR, 16), there are records of 14 cases begun by ad terminum qui preteriit, 18 by 
cui in vita, 7 or 8 by the guardian writ, 2 by sine assensu capituli, 6 for alienations by 
doweresses or other life tenants, 3 for intrusion, I for alienation by bailiff, and I each 
for dum fuit infra etatem and dum fuit non compos mentis. Writs of entry simply were 
not that frequently used even in the 1230s. 
133. Registers, 99 (CC. 212, later revised intotheperformon p. 296: R. 821), 296(R. 822: 
in the per and cui against the man's alienee). CRR, 14:610 (1230) is an interesting 
example of the way in which this kind of situation with entry language appeared prior to 
the provision of the writ. The idea behind this writ was not 'failure of consideration', 
but related more to the relationship between the parties: Palmer, 'Contexts of Mar-
riage', supra note 120, 61-62. 
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The grant supposed in causa matrimonii prelocuti was by substitution, 
not subinfeudation. Subinfeudation would have made the husband hold as 
his wife's tenant, whereas he obviously expected to be her lord. The grant 
by substitution supposed here grew up to correspond to the early practice of 
a husband doing homage for his wife's land to her lord. 134 After a woman 
could do homage and had a secure right in the land herself, many pros-
pective husbands continued to feel that the land should become decisively 
theirs. The grant is thus by substitution, so that the man stepped into the 
tenurial position she and her ancestors had held vis-a-vis the lord. The 
tenurial orientation of this writ was thus not downward: a lord questioning 
her tenants' warrant. Since the grant was by substitution, however, the grant 
itself supposed the lord, even though the lord did not appear in the writ. 
Claimant had held of the lord; Secundus now held of him. The unmentioned 
lord held the position of the named lord in the three-handed writs: that of 
Primus. The effect of the lord continued likewise: his haunting presence still 
counted as one of the three hands. 
Such grants by substitution shared the history of other similar grants. 
Through the early thirteenth century, the lord was a necessary participant. A 
two-party grant, such as the writ supposed, was rare. If the land concerned 
was the woman's inheritance, no grant was necessary. A husband did hom-
age for his wife's inheritance, so that the land during the marriage was his 
more than hers, 135 although that was changing around 1200. Moreover, such 
a grant without the lord's approval was a denial of his lordship, occasioning 
forfeiture of the tenement: both Claimant and Secundus would forfeit. Had 
the land been the woman's marriage portion, the donor's line still had secure 
control: 136 the woman could not alienate without severe consequences. The 
writ simply did not fit twelfth century or early thirteenth-century society. 
Causa matrimonii prelocuti, however, was not an early thirteenth century 
writ; it appeared later in the thirteenth century when lords had ceased being 
necessary participants in such transfers. 137 By mid-thirteenth century lords 
found they had no real control left over who entered their fee. 138 That 
process eventually concluded in Quia Emptores. 139 The writ was provided, 
then, when a woman could actually grant away her land without the lord's 
participation. The lord was, therefore, omitted from the writ. The reach of 
the writ, however, was not thereby shorter: it still reached Tertius. The lord 
134. Glanvill, IX.l. 
135. Milsom, 'Inheritance by Women', 63, 86-87. 
136. The analysis in Milsom, Historical Foundations, 172-74, seems to apply to mid-
thirteenth century. 
137. Registers, 99 (CC. 212 Capella v. Boyvill (1267-68), see Palmer, 'Contexts of Mar-
riage', supra note 120, 62-63, still without entry language), 296 (R.822: in the per and 
cui. 
138. Milsom, Historical Foundations, 115; Prerogativa Regis, supra note 62, xxxvi-xxxvii. 
139. Milsom, Historical Foundations, 113-16. 
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as Primus had been omitted. That pattern of omission, however, establishes 
the same tenurial orientation for this two-handed writ as was embodied in 
the three-handed writs. 
Dumfuit infra etatem ('while he was a minor') was a two-handed writ; 140 
the model derived from causa matrimonii prelocuti is applicable here. Dum 
fuit infra etatem provided a remedy for an adult (or his heir) who had 
alienated his lands as a minor. Minors could not alienate their lands. In 
addition to obvious matters of justice, there was a feudal reason: while a 
minor, his lands were in the wardship and control of his lord. Dumfuit infra 
etatem and the guardian writ are clearly analogous. The similarity explains 
the labelling of certain guardian writs as writs dum fuit infra etatem: the 
guardian writ included those words. 141 Nevertheless, the writs were distinct. 
Dum fuit infra etatem involved no action by the lord: a minor seemingly of 
age attempted to alienate his land. Quite properly, dumfuit infra etatem only 
appeared after purchasers would not reflexively have demanded the approv-
al of the lord also when purchasing the land from the tenant by substitution: 
that is, around mid-century. The concrete difference between the guardian 
writ and this writ, then, is the decline of feudal control evidenced by the 
two-handedness of the writ: the omission of the mention of the lord as 
Primus. Eliminated in the social transfer, he merely haunted the writ. 
... Command Tertius that ... he render to Claimant ten acres ... into 
which he has no entry save by [PER] Secundus, to whom [CUI] Propositus, 
father of the aforesaid Claimant, whose heir he is, demised them while he was 
underage, as he says etc. 
(cui) 
Propositus---------------------- Secundus 
I ~~ I 
Claimant Tertius 
140. Registers, 96 (CC. 199: without entry language), 290 (R. 780: in the per and cui). This 
writ was not available prior to Magna Carta or soon thereafter. CRR, 16:2303 (1242) 
may have been a beginning of it: a suit by a woman against her former guardian for a 
sale she made to him while she was a ward, but without using entry language. For 
earlier alleged cases, see infra note 141. 
141. Supra, note I 08; Rolls of the Justices in Eyre for Gloucestershire, Warwickshire, and 
Staffordshire, 1221-1222, ed. D.M. Stenton, Selden Society, vol. 59 (London, 1940), 
no. 1120 is a guardian writ with the phrase dum fuit infra etatem (which, of course, 
would always have been true in guardian writs) indexed as a writ of entry dumfuit infra 
etatem (p. 752); the same classification problem appeared in Rolls of the Justices in 
Eyre for Lincolnshire, 1218-9, and Worcestershire, 122 I, ed. D.M. Stenton, Selden 
Society, vol. 53 (London, 1934), 569 (667). The crucial difference, of course, is the 
alleged grantor: the ward or the guardian. 
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Dumfuit non compos mentis ('while of unsound mind') was two-handed, 
like dum fuit infra etatem. 142 This writ nullified grants made by those of 
unsound mind. It was also related to a guardianship situation. In the early 
thirteenth century the insane were considered in wardship to their lord; by 
the reign of Edward I the king was their guardian. 143 When the writ first 
appeared, however, the lords were still the relevant guardians. Dumfuit non 
compos mentis was thus not a product of the king's rights and duties to the 
insane. Lords would have found control over the insane difficult, particu-
larly when a tenant had only periods of insanity. Difficulty became im-
possibility when both tenants and purchasers felt little need to consult lords 
in land transactions. The writ was therefore two-handed: the lord had not 
been involved. 
Command Tertius that ... he render to Claimant ten acres ... into which 
he has no entry save by [PER] Secundus, to whom [CUI] Propositus, father of 
the aforesaid Claimant, whose heir he is, demised them while he was of 
unsound mind, as he says etc. 
(cui) 
Propositus----------------------- Secundus 
I ~e~ I 
Claimant Tertius 
.. 
The model developed above has considerable explanatory power. 144 The 
three-handed writs were the guardian writ, the curtesy writ, cui in vita 
(widow reclaiming her land), sur cui in vita (widow's heir reclaiming her 
land), cui ante divorcium (woman reclaiming after an annulment), and sur 
142. Registers, 95 (CC. 196 in both per and per and cui, although indexed only as second 
degree). CRR, 7:296 illustrates the problem of classifying cases as upward or down-
ward without distinguishing fact from claimant's legal conceptualization. This was not 
a writ of entry, but claimant's claim was met by an allegation of claimant's grant to 
tenant for homage and service, making it seem clearly a downward claim. Claimant, 
however, responded that he was insane at the time and in the wardship of the tenant, 
who was his uncle: thus, in some sense, it was likewise upward-looking, as against his 
former guardian. See CRR, 13:1921 ( 1229); IS: 1309, 1394 (1235): possibly the earliest 
cases. 
143. Maitland, 'The "Praerogativa Regis",' supra note 62, 184-86; Pollock and Maitland, 
Hist. Eng. Law, 1:481. 
144. Two further writs deserve some mention here: sine assensu capituli and the writ of 
entry after the revocation of an outlawry. Sine assensu was two-handed: CRR, II: 1187 
(1223); 15:1665 (1236). I am still unsure who Primus was-perhaps the chapter, 
without whose consent the previous abbot had alienated the land, was Primus. Early 
examples: 12:560 (1225) (in the per, went to the grand assize by a special mise.) The 
writ of entry after the revocation of an outlawry is not really well-enough known to 
classify yet. The examples in Registers 97, are in the first and second degree, and that 
register in its computations would thus contemplate a third degree also, making a 
three-handed writ. That would make good sense, because the first-hand was always the 
lord of whom Claimant claimed to hold, since the land had escheated back to the lord 
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disseisin (disseisee's heir recovering from disseisor's heir or feoffee). 
Application of the model they generate to dum fuit infra etatem (adult 
voiding his minority grant), dumfuit non compos mentis (reclaiming against 
a lunatic's grant), causa matrimonii prelocuti (undoing of a marital grant), 
and cui ante divorcium (reclaiming from assumed husband's grantees) pro-
vides a uniform explanation of the per and cui rule. Writs of entry were 
three-handed by nature. The Primus of the three-handed writs was merely 
omitted in the two-handed writs, but the reach remained the same. The 
two-handed writs were provided as lords lost their control in specific situa-
tions. 
This model clarifies the conceptualization of the writ ad terminum qui 
preteriit ('for a term that has expired'). 145 Ad terminum qui preteriit might 
have seemed a good example of Milsom's downward-looking hypothesis. 146 
The termor or gage-holder was not protected at common law. He could not 
use novel disseisin against his debtor: his debtor retained the free tenement. 
The creditor's proper remedy was simply debt. 147 For the lessee, the remedy 
was covenant. 148 Such a vulnerability might make a gage situation seem 
downward-looking. The model, however, indicates that the lessor/debtor 
was looking upwards to a presumed lord who had done nothing and then 
downward to the tenant alleged implicitly to be claiming to hold of the 
lessor/debtor's lord. Of the numerous possible gaging situations, 149 then, 
the one embodied in ad terminum qui preteriit-regardless of the situations 
of those who actually used it-was that in which the creditor/gage-holder 
had received the gage on condition that he would become the fee-holder 
holding from the debtor's lord on default of payment. 150 
after the king's profit from the escheat. Since the relationship of Primus here to 
claimant is explicit (lord of the fee), it is likewise similar to other three-handed writs, 
which specify the relationship (guardian, husband, etc.). 
145. Text supra at note 104; note that while ad terminum qui preteriit was two-handed, on 
occasions a three-handed version appeared. In 1214 a writ concerning a term without 
the ad terminum qui preteriit formula was used in something like a cui in vita situation: 
CRR, 7:282. In 1228, a three-handed version was apparently modelled on the villein-
age writ, with the termor holding from the claimant; CRR, 13:405. 
146. Milsom, Historical Foundations, 146-48. 
147. Glanvill, X.ll; RCR, 2:247-48. 
148. Baker, English Legal History, supra note 115, 252. 
149. Glanvill, X.6 mentions the situations in which seisin of the gage is given or not, and in 
which there is a fixed term or not, and in which there is an agreement that on default the 
land will be the creditor's or in which there is not such an agreement. One can also 
imagine differences arising from whether the creditor was a Jew, one's lord (PRS XIV, 
48 (1194); CRR, 4:40-41), one's tenants, an outsider, or one of the homage group of 
one's lord, and whether one was gaging the whole of the fee held of the lord or only 
part. 
ISO. Supra note 149. This is a plausible situation, because the lord would then have someone 
to deal with from whom he could expect the services, whereas an absentee tenant would 
create numerous problems. 
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This conceptualization according to a substitution model (tenant being 
substituted into the grantor's position) 151 implies the lord's loss of control 
over tenants thus gaging. Prior to the Assize of Northampton (1176) lords 
could not have been omitted from such a gage. The condition that the 
creditor would hold the fee on default would have been to the lord's dis-
honor and disherison: it would have forced on him a tenant, were that 
possible. Glanvill's disciplinary standards in 1188 dictated confiscation of 
the tenement: neither creditor nor debtor would have been tenant. 152 The 
lord's participation at the time of the gage and agreement to the eventual 
acceptance of the creditor as tenant-perhaps we should imagine another of 
the lord's tenants lending to secure a younger son a position-appears in the 
description of the gage-holder as possessing some kind of seisin. 153 The 
lord's loss of control could have occurred at two points: the control over the 
initial gage and the determination of default. Slowly but increasingly after 
1176 the standardized writs dictated that lords act in standard ways toward 
their tenants, thus insulating tenants from the lord's action. Tenants and 
prospective lenders may not then have reflexively included the lord in such 
transactions. Probably that was not the first step, unless for people who were 
sure the lord would not approve and had to take the risk. More likely was an 
initial loss of control in the determination of default. Default is a non-event, 
but the gage-holder would immediately claim the fee. When payment would 
always surely have taken place before the lord, the lord could be sure of the 
consequences, as could his court. But when payments were made else-
where, a lord might well be unsure about what to do with a creditor now 
claiming a fee. Once he claimed a fee, he was protected until it was proved 
that he had merely held a gage: the over-claim resulted in forfeiture. 154 The 
only safe course for the lord was to contact the debtor and advise him to sue, 
on default of which the lord would then accept the creditor's homage un-
conditionally. But the lord would not have wanted them to litigate in his 
court: he was apparently committed to both parties and the court's knowl-
edge would not extend to something done elsewhere. The lord would prefer 
to remain neutral. Ad terminum qui preteriit thus corresponds to the model 
established by examination of all the other writs of entry. 
The writs of entry were thus a single class, governed by a single model. In 
legal conceptualization, they were upward-downward: a claimant looking 
I 51. Milsom supposes, probably correctly, that substitution was rare in the late twelfth and 
early thirteenth century. That does not prevent substitution from being the conceptual 
model upon which the writs of entry were based. Substitution was the artificial situation 
necessarily supposed by the rule that a writ of right must be directed to the lord of 
whom one claims to hold. 
152. Supra note 33. 
153. Glanvill, X.6 (creditor receives seisin of the gage), X.ll (creditor loses seisin of his 
gage), XIII. I I (gage-holder has some sort of seisin qualemcumque seisinam); CRR, 
5:16. 
154. Glanvill, XIII.30. 
Origins of Property 39 
upward to his lord, who had made a downward grant. When the lord had not 
actually been involved, he was eliminated from the writ; but the writ at 
maximum reach still was appropriate against the same tenant: Tertius. The 
explanatory power of the conceptual model establishes that there is a social-
legal ground to the writs: at their origins the writs of entry corresponded to 
social power structures and were not simply protections of abstract property 
rights progressively provided to fill gaps in a remedy structure. 
Writs of Entry II: The Derivation of the Form 
A unitary legal conceptualization, however, does not imply a single ori-
gin for the form of the writ. The writs of entry did not derive, as one might 
think from Milsom's argument, solely from the undifferentiated precipe in 
Glanvill. 155 In Milsom's framework the entry language was a jurisdictional 
justification for avoidance of the feudal courts: the claimant was himself the 
lord of the relevant feudal court. Moreover, in that framework writs of entry 
derived solely from writs that could determine in the grand assize or battle. 
Since that construction dictated a downward-looking orientation for the 
writs, they could have little in common with the upward looking assizes of 
mort d' ancestor and novel disseisin. 156 The derivation of the form, as ex-
plained below, demonstrates that the origins of the writs of entry are more 
diverse, explaining the assumption by writs of entry of the middle position 
in the hierarchy of writs. 
The most important-not the sole-source of the form of the writs of 
entry is the gage writ in Glanvill. That writ is here modified only in names 
and land designation to correspond with the writ of entry ad terminum qui 
preteriit. 157 
The king to the sheriff, greeting. Command Secundus that justly and without 
delay he render ten acres of land with appurtenances in Whitton to Claimant, 
who gaged it to him for a hundred marks for a term which has expired [ad 
155. Glanvill, 1.6. Milsom 's view on the development of the writs of entry remains obscure. 
He admits readily that several writs of entry-at least ad terminum qui preteriit and sur 
disseisin-existed prior to Magna Carta (Milsom, Legal Framework, 95, 101), 
although he does not deal with the origins of ad terminum qui preteriit. He continues to 
stress Magna Carta c. 34 as resulting in the incorporation of entry language into the 
precipe as a jurisdictional statement (Milsom, Historical Foundations, 146-48). But if 
several writs of entry existed prior to 1215, the effect of c. 34 would seem a subsidiary 
development: perhaps only the appearance of consistency. At any rate, the use of the 
language in writs prior to 1215 would have to be explained, and presumably the 
explanation would not be as a jurisdictional specification. 
156. Milsom, Historical Foundations, 146-47. 
157. Glanvill, X.9. After the provision of ad terminum qui preteriit (1199 or earlier), that 
writ would form the pattern. Each new writ would not resort back to the writ of first 
summons, and it is highly unlikely that ad terminum qui preteriit derived from the writ 
of first summons except insofar as the gage writ derived from it. 
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terminum qui preteriit], as Claimant says, which he alleges he has redeemed 
by payment. And if he does not (so render) ... then summon Secundus etc. 
The portions of the gage writ identical to the writ ad terminum qui preteriit 
are italicized. There are only a few differences. The gage writ specified the 
loan and alleged payment or readiness to pay. It did not include the word 
'entry'. But since ad terminum qui preteriit was the earliest writ of entry, 
the two writs were so similar, and the gage writ disappeared at about the 
time ad terminum qui preteriit appeared, the gage writ is the most likely 
candidate for the writ that developed into ad terminum qui preteriit, not 
Glanvill's writ of first summons. 158 
The introduction of the entry language into the gage writ derived from 
Glanvill's judicial assizes. 159 Immediately after retailing the gage writ, 
Glanvill handled the situation in which the creditor, summoned into court by 
the gage writ, claimed the land as his fee. 160 This claim was understandable 
if the gage was made on the condition that the creditor would become fee 
holder upon default of payment. On the request of either party, then, a 
recognition would be made to come to answer whether the creditor held the 
land as a gage or as his fee. Significantly, Glanvill indicated that the 
recognition treated not only the dispute between debtor and creditor as 
original parties, but could also determine whether the current tenant's father 
or other ancestor had held in gage or in fee: this recognition, in effect, was 
not limited to Secundus, but reached Tertius also. 161 Glanvill also provided 
the writ for this recognition: the recognition fee or gage, 162 of which there 
are examples in the early plea rolls. 163 The word 'entry' does not appear in 
these judicial assizes, but the question put to the jurors was precisely that 
asked in ad terminum qui preteriit. Ad terminum qui preteriit was the ju-
dicial assize question incorporated into the original gage writ. As the first 
writ of entry it served as the model form for its companion writs. 
!58. There are several surviving writs ad terminum qui preteriit from 1199: PBK, I :3487, 
3506, 3538. 
159. Palmer, County Courts, supra note 37, 327. 
160. Glanvill, X.I0-11. 
161. It is of some interest to speculate about what Glanvill meant by 'father or some other 
ancestor' of the creditor. It seems likely that the ancestor specification was not as broad 
as it would have been in a writ of right, but rather the kind of limitation found in an 
assize of mort d'ancestor: father, mother, brother, sister, aunt, or uncle. 
162. Glanvill, XIII.27. Note that the fee or gage recognition follows and seems patterned on 
the assize utrum. The vital question in fee or gage is 'whether (utrum) the carucate of 
land in that vill that R. claims from N. by my writ is the inheritance (or fee) of N. or a 
gage pledged to him by R. (or R. 's ancestor H)'. 
163. RCR, I :361 (1199); 2:137, 218 ( 199-1200), and with entry language, because deriving 
from a writ of entry ad terminum qui preteriit; 2:211 ( 1200); 2:227 ( 1200); PRS XIV, 
135 (1195); RCR, I :312, 2:46-47; CRR, I: !58, 220 (1199-1200). Most of these derive 
from gage writs. 
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The writ of entry concerning the guardian derived from a similar process. 
An adult claimant in mort d' ancestor could defeat a minor tenant's attempt 
to postpone the plea until majority by alleging that the minor's ancestor (not 
named in the writ) had died seised as of wardship and not as of fee. That 
precipitated the judicial assize fee or wardship. 164 The claimant, however, 
would know in advance that the tenant was a minor and that he would have 
to proceed to the fee or wardship assize. The issue formulated could use 
entry language. 165 Claimant might well prefer to incorporate that matter into 
the writ; the appropriate model would be ad terminum qui preteriit. Thus the 
claimant from the beginning had been oriented tenurially upwards: suing his 
lord. In that context, the words of the judicial assize could well be simply 
incorporated into a precipe writ, but as easily into the gage writ format as 
into Glanvill's writ of first summons. Moreover since cui in vita was a 
variant of the guardian writ, this development explains both the guardian 
writ and cui in vita. 
Sur disseisin developed from the assize of novel disseisin, not from a 
precipe. Novel disseisin would fail if either of the original parties died: the 
assize could only pass between the original parties. 166 After 1204, however, 
plaintiffs were allowed to proceed in certain circumstances by a precipe: sur 
disseisin. 167 This was likewise oriented tenurially upwards, since novel 
disseisin was primarily upwards; the tenurial orientation would not change 
by the death of one of the parties. The four earliest writs of entry-ad 
terminum qui preteriit, the guardian writ, cui in vita and sur disseisin-thus 
had clear roots in assize writs. 
Nonetheless, the assize questions were incorporated into a precipe for-
mat. Professor Milsom has demonstrated that entry language and questions 
appeared in writs of right patent removed into the king's court. 168 Since a 
tenant of a free tenement did not have to answer unless there was a writ, a 
lord challenging a tenant's warrant had to have a writ. But the only writs 
available prior to the writs of entry were the writ of right patent and the 
undifferentiated precipe (Glanvill's writ of first summons). The latter served 
well if the lord claimed to hold directly of the king, but the crucial question 
concerned the tenant's warrant: by what warrant are you on the land? In the 
164. Glanvill, Xlll.l3-14; Palmer, 'Feudal Framework', 1158. 
165. CRR, 1:136, 116, 181; CRR, 2:219. It is hard to see how, given such upward use of 
entry language, Milsom states that 'The first appearance of "entry" clauses, then, is 
not in original writs of entry. It is in requests by demandants in "writs of right" for a 
special issue to be put to a jury'. Milsom, Historical Foundations, 147. The first 
appearance was not in writs of entry, but neither was it solely derivative of writs of 
right: the assize of mort d' ancestor was equally a source of such language, and in an 
upward context. 
166. Sutherland, Novel Disseisin, supra note 44, 141. 
167. Hall, 'Sur Disseisin', supra note 124, 586-87. 
168. Milsom, Legal Framework, 95-102. 
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former situation, this lord did not hold directly from the king, but from 
another lord. A writ of right patent had always to be directed to the lord of 
whom one claimed to hold, so that the claimant lord here was prevented 
from pursuing the tenant in his own court: it would eventually come into the 
king's court by toft and pone. The question again would be the warrant: how 
the tenant had entered the land. ln such situations, then, entry language 
would occur in other than assize writs. 169 Moreover, this social situation 
may have been behind many or even most writs of entry: the pleading often 
reveals a downward orientation in factual terms, even though the writ was 
upward-downward. 
The relationship of the writs of entry to the precipe and writ of right 
accounts for the legal conceptualization. The precipe form was most appro-
priate for a claimant who claimed to hold of the king. Suppose, however, 
the claimant to have gaged in the manner presented as typical for ad ter-
minum qui preteriit: on default the creditor would become tenant in fee. 170 
Since any gage might endanger the services or eventually involve the lord 
king with a new tenant, the king confirmed the gage. 171 At the end of the 
term, the creditor claimed the fee. The debtor/claimant, alleging payment, 
looked to his lord the king, who had been in some sense privy to the 
agreement, for redress by a precipe. Instead of waiting for the situation to 
emerge in court, however, the claimant included the gage allegation in the 
precipe. In such a situation the claimant's lord's court-the king's court-
was a relevant jurisdiction: he had confirmed the gage. The lord's court of 
any lesser claimant would likewise be an appropriate jurisdiction. But nei-
ther the king nor a lesser lord would often have personal knowledge of the 
alleged payment or the satisfaction of other conditions. The formalized 
upward component to the precipe accounts for the orientation of the writs of 
entry. All writs of entry, like ad terminum qui preteriit, look first upwards 
because precipe writs, originally looking upward to the king as lord, easily 
adapted to looking upward to a non-regal lord, explicit or assumed. The lord 
as explicit or presumed Primus corresponds, in a twisted fashion, to the rule 
that writs of right had to be addressed to the lord of whom one claimed to 
hold. 
The position of writs of entry as the middle tier in the hierarchy of writs 
was not mere coincidence. They derived from procedural elements of the 
two preceding levels. That joint derivation explains some of the less impor-
tant rules surrounding the writs of entry. The relationship to the proprietary 
writs, thus, explains why the writs of entry could in the early decades 
proceed on to determination by grand assize. 172 The relationship to the 
169. Milsom, Historical Foundations, 146-48. 
170. Text supra at note 150. 
171. Supra note 33. 
172. Bracton, 4:43. It is unlikely that all the cases that look like entry but that end in a grand 
assize were actually writs of right to begin with. The claimant's option was explicitly 
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assizes explains how writs that were framed in a precipe format could be 
subject to a mort d' ancestor time limitation and why minors in the early 
decades could bring a writ of entry. 173 The writs of entry were hybrid 
creations. The origins of the forms of the writ reinforce the legal 
conceptualization-the upward-downward orientation-that appears from 
analysis of the three-handedness of the writs. 
Writs of Entry III: Rationale for the Writs of Entry 
The model assimilating two-handed writs to three-handed writs remains 
inadequate until it explains also why there should have been any limit at all. 
There was no reason obvious in the writs to show why they did not reach to 
Quartus, Quintus or even Sextus before the provision of writs of entry in the 
post. Theoretically, if a middle tier of litigation was desirable in itself, there 
would be no jurisprudential reason for limiting it precisely to Tertius. If a 
limitation was necessary, a limitation in time instead of hands would have 
been more rational and traditional. A restriction by the number of hands the 
land had passed through is sufficiently curious to require investigation. 
The limitation by hands reflected the protection provided tenants by the 
assizes. In two-handed writs like ad terminum qui preteriit, the manner in 
which the assize of novel disseisin prevented lords from challenging the 
warrant of tenants in their own courts explains the vulnerability of Secun-
dus: Claimant had approached the lord, who found he could do nothing 
without a writ, because Secundus had some kind of seisin. Moreover, had 
Claimant brought a writ of right patent in his lord's court, Secundus would 
vouch the lord to warranty, because in some way he had been accepted by 
the lord. Preferable for all was a precipe straight to the king's court, where 
the lord could remain neutral in a situation in which he was in some way 
committed to both litigants. Tertius became vulnerable-the writs were not 
all able to reach Tertius at origins-when the kind of seisin Secundus pos-
sessed was sufficient for Tertius to utilize mort d' ancestor. (It seems the 
rules were worked out with descent and not alienation in mind as related to 
the connection between Secundus and Tertius.) Tertius's hold on the land 
was solely the acceptance of Secundus; that hold was insufficient to pass to 
Quartus. But since mort d' ancestor could only be framed on the death of a 
parent, sibling, aunt or uncle, Quartus could not claim on the death of 
Secundus. Quartus was still vulnerable to lordly action, so the writs of entry 
stopped short of Quartus. With three-handed writs the lord was further 
impeded by his own actions. The writs of entry expanded only far enough to 
redress the dislocations occasioned by novel disseisin and mort d' ancestor. 
asserted in CRR, 13:668 (1228), and see the cases of sine assensu capifllli, supra note 
147. 
173. For the mort d' ancestor limitation: CRR, I 0:286; 14: II 0 I. For the minor claimants: 
CRR, 3:92-93, 4:203, 4:221, 13:2342 (1234). 
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Cui in vita demonstrates for three-handed writs the logic behind this 
explanation. In cui in vita the husband had granted by subinfeudation (con-
ceptually) to Secundus: he had substituted Secundus into his wife's tenancy, 
taking homage. The husband's heir, bound to warrant his father's grants, 
would be reluctant to do anything. Secundus could use novel disseisin: he 
had given homage even to an appropriate lord. 174 Since he was seised in 
demesne as of fee, his heir was protected by mort d' ancestor as the son of a 
tenant who had been fully accepted by a lord. The lord-man relationship, 
however, grew tenuous when each of the parties to a homage had died. 175 If 
Primus's heir took neither the homage of Secundus nor that of Tertius, 
Quartus was probably vulnerable to lordly action. If Quartus was otherwise 
vulnerable, a writ of entry would be superfluous. 
By this hypothesis the writ ad terminum qui preteriit reached Tertius 
because the lord could not act in his own court on his own motion on behalf 
of the claimant. Had the gage-holder been a mere intruder, there would have 
been no problem: the lord could eject him. The gage-holder, however, had 
been accepted onto the land. Normally, the lord had confirmed the gage. 176 
The gage-holder even in Glanvill's time was not so seised that he could use 
the assize of novel disseisin to protect himself. 177 Nonetheless, the con-
sensual origins to his tenancy gave him some sort of seisin: qualemcumque 
seisinam. 178 If the gage-holder then claimed fee, it was a tenancy that the 
lord had accepted when he confirmed the gage. His seisin was no longer 
qualemcumque seisinam but seisin protectable by novel disseisin, although 
not proof against a writ of right. Moreover, it was a seisin that would benefit 
his heir. Any tenant who died seised in demesne as of fee-whether rightful-
ly or wrongfully-was the basis for a claim by his child, sibling, nephew or 
niece for entry onto the land enforced by mort d' ancestor. The lord could 
not deny them that entry. Nor could he sue the person claiming the fee, 
although the lord thought him only a gage-holder: the lord could not claim 
the land in demesne. The gage-holder, however, would seek to give the lord 
his homage, if that had not been done conditionally at the confirmation of 
the gage. Even more insistent about rendering homage would be the gage-
holder's heir. He was entitled to enter because his father had been seised in 
demesne as of fee when he died. But what about the heir's heir? Was a 
tenant who entered by reason of his father's seisin but who had never been 
accepted himself adequate foundation for his heir's claim by mort d' ances-
174. Compare this with the Countess Amice case, text supra accompanying notes 96-98. 
Note that the widow's writ of right would not go to the heir: she would not claim to hold 
inherited land from him. But the heir could do nothing on his own volition. 
175. Thome, 'English Feudalism', 200-201. 
176. Text supra at notes 150, 171. 
177. Glanvill, X.ll. 
178. Ibid., XIII.ll. 
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tor? Mort d' ancestor claimed only from the claimant's father, mother, 
brother, sister, aunt or uncle: no mention could be made of one's father's 
father. Presumably the lord could act against such a tenant. 
The vulnerability of Quartus, however, may not have lasted long. In the 
1250s the magnates felt strongly that the per and cui rule unduly restricted 
the writs of entry: that was one of their major complaints about the law. 179 
Belatedly writs of entry in the post ('after') were provided. 180 Thereafter, if 
the writ could be formulated using per or per and cui it had to be done in the 
traditional form. If the situation exceeded the traditional degrees, the writ 
could be framed in the post, merely stating that the tenant had no entry 
except after ('post') a demise from Propositus to Secundus: all intermediate 
holders were ignored. The need to expand the reach probably derived from 
the same pressure that resulted in the provision of aiel, besaiel, and cosinage 
in the 1230s. 181 Those writs expanded mort d'ancestor-type protection to 
heirs more distant than sons, siblings, nephews, and nieces, probably in-
dicating a wider acceptance of people in the position of Quartus. 
The magnates' desire to expand the reach of the writs of entry derived 
from a peculiar advantage for lords in the writs of entry. On a writ of right, 
the tenant could vouch whoever had given him the land. But on a writ of 
entry a long-standing but flexible custom-by mid-thirteenth century hard-
ened into a rule-dictated that the tenant could not vouch outside the line. 182 
A tenant could only vouch to warranty those people named in the writ 
through whom he had allegedly gained his tenancy. 183 His alternative to 
vouching or defending on his own was to deny that he had entry only 
through the people Claimant alleged. If the tenant was successful in denying 
the entry, Claimant's suit failed. The inability of the tenant to vouch outside 
the line, however, meant that lords who had not participated in a transfer-
who were thus presumed in the writs as Primus but not mentioned-could 
not be vouched. The two parties thus had to resolve the matter between 
themselves. Such an exclusion was not possible in the Countess Amice case 
in 1200; it would be possible late in the century, when lords actually were 
less involved. 
179. Milsom, Historical Foundations, 149. 
180. Statute of Marlborough, c. 29 
181. CRR, 16:183, 301; Bracton's Note Book, ed. F.W. Maitland (Littleton, 1983), 3:no. 
1215; Milsom, Historical Foundations, 132, 137. 
182. Usually if there were vouchers, the vouchers would be in the line anyway. When they 
were not, sometimes it is unclear who the vouchee is: occasionally a seeming stranger 
might be heir to one named in the line. In apparent instances of vouching outside the 
line, however, most were probably to prove the other entry rather than to continue the 
case, except when the claimant was pleading in the right: CRR, 7: 122; 8:230 (allowed); 
8:196 (allowed); 8:227 Uury preferred to voucher); 9:88 (voucher ignored and jury 
summoned); Bracton, 3:160. 
183. Supra note 103. 
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The rule forbidding vouching outside the line was thus most relevant in 
two-handed writs. From the first, then, it was important for ad terminum qui 
preteriit: it prevented a lord's confirmation of a gage from obliging him to 
stand by one or the other party when he might not know if the debtor had 
paid the creditor. Had he been vouched and warranted the creditor only to 
find out that payment had not been made, he would have been obliged to 
provide escambium. Only when he had unqualifiedly accepted the creditor's 
homage would he be obliged to warrant: but that acceptance of homage 
would quash the writ of entry, because the creditor would then have had 
entry otherwise than through the gage. But the rule was likewise relevant in 
writs like cui in vita, obviously three-handed writs. In that situation it 
directed the vouching back to the husband and his heirs, and did not allow 
the husband to vouch further the lord (usually the woman's father) who had 
given that land to him along with the bride. Magnates wanted to expand the 
reach of the writs of entry not only because they as litigants found the writs 
useful; the writs also limited the obligations of lords in a reasonable manner. 
At this point, then, the two major rules for the writs of entry mesh, as do 
the concerns relating to the legal conceptualization, form, and the rationale 
for the writs. The legal conceptualization established that Primus, whether 
presumed or named in the writ, was the lord. A presumed Primus indicated 
that the lord had not participated in the relevant transfer: he was eliminated 
from the writ because he had been omitted in the situation. The vouching 
rule was a perfect complement to the legal conceptualization. The elimina-
tion of the presumed Primus from the writ was not only an esthetic or social 
statement, but a reasonable limitation on the liability of lords. The per and 
cui rule and the rule against vouching outside the line are, thus, not useless 
and irrelevant technicalities. They become social-legal statements about 
social structure and the interaction between law and society: about legal 
causation of social change and legal adaptation required by changed social 
context. 
Conclusion 
Property in England, then, was not an intentional creation. The Com-
promise of 1153 was the first categorical royal intervention between lords 
and accepted tenants. But neither the magnates nor the king thought in terms 
of property: the restoration of the disinherited was not a permanent restric-
tion on lordly authority or, indeed, any alteration in the functioning of the 
personal relationship of which the fee was the physical embodiment. The 
Assize of Northampton, the more decisive provision, likewise presumed no 
notion of property. Henry II was there concerned only to regulate the 
choices made by lords in choosing successor tenants, so that lords utilized 
peace-time standards instead of standards appropriate for rebellion. That 
regulation resulted in a variety of standardized writs; the litigation that those 
writs made possible generated a court that increasingly operated in a bureau-
cratic fashion. That court then applied customary standards as rules of law. 
Whereas customary standards operated with flexibility and in accord with 
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social mores, rules of law were inflexible. As with the Countess Amice 
case, these rules separated law from social mores. 
The appearance of the first writs of entry around 1200 marks not only this 
gap between mores and law, but also the recognition of property. The 
existence of a difference between the legal conceptualization of the writs 
and the social facts that prompted litigation indicates that law already could 
not be equated with traditional procedures or intuited justice. The law be-
came increasingly artificial. The word 'entry' in some sense, moreover, 
must connote the kind of things Maitland thought it would, although in a 
much different way. The presumed Primus of the two-handed writs meant 
that conceptually such cases were between two parties claiming to hold of 
the same lord, and the lord was now excluded from consideration. This 
comes close to a horizontal model, with 'entry' assuming connotations of 
ownership. 
The origins of property demonstrate that law is not merely a reflection of 
society and social.mores. Even at the beginnings of the English legal sys-
tem, one can discern an interaction between law and mores. While undeni-
ably a major portion of property law derived from social custom, part of the 
law developed by accident: by acts that had unintended consequences. Such 
consequences had substantial impact on social life. Law is, after all, bureau-
cratic force tightly focused on particular aspects of social relationships. 
From one perspective, the change was precisely the appearance of property. 
But property was not a 'mere' legal phenomenon, an intellectual construct 
without social relevance. Property, antithetical to feudal relations, de-
termined the exercise of power in society. 
Appendix 
Deceptive Three- and Four-Handed Writs of Entry 
There are writs of entry other than those treated in the body of the paper 
that have more complicated structures, although they correspond to the 
general pattern: the deceptive three- and four-handed writs. The deceptive 
three-handed writs all named a party who was not the lord between Pro-
positus or Claimant and Secundus. That person, however, was not Primus: 
Primus was presumed. The extra person was simply ignored. 
The writ of entry alleging an entry through a tenant at will seems three-
handed but was actually two-handed. 184 The writ could list the tenant at 
184. CRR, 14:905: Claimant's brother, a tenant at will, alienated to a bishop, who alienated 
to tenant, who was now vulnerable to litigation by writ of entry. CRR, 14:1758 is a 
further example. The writ does not appear in Registers. Early examples, CRR, 12:370 
(alienor v. alienee, issue going to grand assize on a special mise.) Note that the writ of 
entry by alienation of claimant's farmer (CRR, 13:1465): reaching farmer's alienee's 
alienee, but with a per and quibus; also alienation of dower land by one's bailiff, 
reaching to bailiff's alienee's alienee (CRR, 15:612). 
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will's alienee's alienee. But the tenant at will held of the Claimant. The land 
at that point had not left Claimant's control. If the tenant at will had con-
veyed any fee at all to Secundus, it had to have been Claimant's fee. 
Claimant's natural recourse would be to his own lord: the Primus who is 
omitted and had done nothing. For the purposes of the writ, Claimant 
supposed that Secundus claimed to hold as he himself held: from Primus. 
Since Claimant controlled the tenant at will and Primus here had done 
nothing at all, the tenant at will was not counted; Primus was omitted: the 
writ was a two-handed writ reaching to Tertius. The same analysis applies to 
an alleged entry through a villein. 1g5 The alienation of a doweress was also 
treated like that of the tenant at will. Entry through a doweress 186 lists the 
doweress's husband Propositus and could reach the doweress's alienee's 
alienee: superficially a three-handed writ. But a doweress held her dower 
from the heir of her husband: she was Claimant's tenant and theoretically in 
his control. The writ was really two-handed. His control revived with the 
Statute of Gloucester, which allowed Claimant to recover immediately if the 
doweress alienated. 187 
The writ for the alienation of the doweress suggests a hypothetical ex-
planation for the writs of intrusion. 188 The intruder was either the heir or 
other relative of the deceased life tenant (not the reversioner), a bastard, or a 
genuine outside claimant. ttN Some have doubted whether writs of intrusion 
were really writs of entry. 190 They developed relatively late and seem to 
have had their origins in ideas of wrong, 191 at a time when property had 
already become distinct from wrongs and obligations. The problem with 
185. Bracton, 4:36; P.R. Hyams, King, Lords, and Peasants in Medieval England, (Oxford, 
1980), 41-43. CRR, 11:2145 (1224): 'in quam idem (tenant) non habet ingressum nisi 
per (Secundum) patrem suum, cui Johannes filius Reginaldi earn dimisit ad terminum, 
qui earn tenuit in vilenagio'. Note the term alleged in this writ, which makes the writ 
somewhat like ad terminum qui preteriit, perhaps, in the early years. CRR, 12:330 
(1225) (similarly three-handed); 12:465. 
186. Registers, 96 (CC. 200: in the per, 293 (R. 803: in the per and cui against doweress's 
alienee's alienee, or, here, doweress's alienee's husband); CRR, 9:252 (1220) (against 
doweress's alienee's alienee); 15:348. 
187. The so-called 'in casu proviso' writ: Registers, 298 (R. 833, 834). 
188. Ibid., 96 (CC. 200a, 200b, 201), 294-96 (R. 805-820), 302-303 (R.855-860). Per-
plexingly, some early cases of intrusion [CRR, 12:2057 and 12:2526 (the latter a minor 
claimant whose father died seised as of fee, concerning a posthumous daughter v. 
nephews] alleged entry by intrusion after the death of a tenant seised as of fee. 
189. Milsom, citing an early fourteenth-century report, says an heir of the life tenant would 
not be an intruder: Milsom, Introduction to Novae Narrationes, cxl, n. 5. Bracton 
thought differently: Bracton, 4:37. For a detailed instance of a late thirteenth-century 
case, see Palmer, Whilton Dispute, supra note 2, 147-49. 
190. Registers, cv; Milsom, Introduction to Novae Narrationes, cxl-cxli. 
191. The writ was sometimes called a writ of attachment, and plaintiffs were described as 
complaining. Moreover, early intrusion accusations (not writs of entry of intrusion) 
normally involved allegation of some royal interest, such as a breach of a final concord 
(CRR, I :56; I: 170; 6:203; 14: 1473) or violation of a judgment of the king's court 
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intrusion here is that they were seemingly four-handed. Suppose that the 
doweress in the preceeding writ had not alienated but had rather died in 
possession, whereupon her bastard took possession. The heir of her first 
husband could then claim not only against the intruder, but also as far as 
against the intruder's alienee's alienee. After Propositus, then, there were 
doweress, intruder, alienee, and alienee's alienee: four hands since Pro-
positus. 192 One can reduce the four to three by eliminating the doweress as 
tenant of the heir and thus in his control. Having reduced the four to three, 
the intruder might necessarily have seemed to be Primus. That identifica-
tion, however, would be contrary to the origins of intrusion 193 and thus 
gratuitous. It is more likely that, since the writ against the intruder's 
alienee's alienee was late, intrusion began as a seemingly three-handed writ 
that was two-handed, with the lord presumed. Then, in the late thirteenth 
century, when the difference between a disseisor and an intruder would not 
seem monumental since the archetypical disseisor was no longer the lord, 
the writ of intrusion was extended by analogy to sur disseisin. This scenario 
is believable, because sur disseisin at the same time superseded the writ 
concerning the guardian. 
The extension for the writ of intrusion after the death of a doweress thus 
made some sense; that for intrusion after the death of a tenant in the curtesy 
made little. 194 In the fourteenth century true heir could reach intruder's 
alienee's alienee also when the intrusion had been after the death of a tenant 
in the curtesy. By that time, however, the doweress and the tenant in the 
curtesy were being treated similarly: the attempt by either to alienate .during 
their tenancy enabled the true heir to claim. 195 Superficially, moreover, the 
(CRR, 3:28; 4:184; 8:32; 8:150; 14:235), force or force and arms (CRR, 1:104; 4:80-
81; 4:118; 6:237; 8:138; 8:147; 8:204; 8:394; 10:106; 10:112; 14:2432; 15:253; 
15:305), a privilege granted by the king (CRR, 3:69), a royal wardship involved (CRR, 
5:221), violation of a royal order (CRR, 8:148), involvement of one in the king's 
service (CRR, 8:174), or other miscellaneous matters (CRR, 7:245; 8:21; 9:381; 
10:325). 
192. Registers, 295 (R. 815), 296 (R.819). 
193. Intrusion seems to have been exactly the kind of plea Milsom portrays as typical of 
writs entry: a downward plea of a lord against his tenant. Intrusion inquiries could 
contain the quo warranto words (CRR, 4:250; 6:351; 8:238 (considered along with 
8:236); 8:297; 10:325). Seemingly the inquiries could be on behalf of the lord's ward 
(CRR, I :378; 6:321) or in his own interest. A certain number of the intrusion inquiries 
involving the king were probably of the former kind (supra note 193). The most likely 
positions for the lord would thus have been either as plaintiff or (and I take this 
alternative as the probable one) as the presumed lord who had finally dropped out of the 
litigation, leaving it up to his tenant. 
194. Registers, 296 (R. 819). Equating the doweress and the tenant in the curtesy was 
possible because both were life tenants. They were different in that the doweress held of 
the main line, whereas the tenant in the curtesy held of the chief lord (for a woman's 
inherited land) or from the grantor's line (for maritagium). 
195. For the doweress situation: the writ in casu proviso (Registers, 298 (R. 833-835)); for 
the tenant in the curtesy: the writ in consimili casu (ibid., 298 (R. 836--838)). 
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two-handed (but seemingly three-handed) writ concerning the alienation of a 
deceased doweress seems identical to the three-handed writ concerning the 
alienation of a tenant in the curtesy. The analogy of the doweress situation to 
sur disseisin would thus have affected analysis in intrusion after the tenant in 
curtesy: the tenant in curtesy was ignored, despite the fact that he was 
theoretically a lord, and the writ reached intruder's alienee's alienee. This 
approach, at least, might account for the writs of intrusion that have proved 
anomalous in every other treatment of the writs of entry. 
